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Abstract 
The thesis describes and analyzes incentives and motivation, an institutional background, 
individual characteristics and quality of corporate governance and their impact on a level 
and a structure of executive compensation. The principal-agent model, the managerial 
power approach and the stewardship model are analyzed and the comparative study is 
included. Moreover, multitasking and earnings management are discussed. 
The practical part reminds the transition period and results in the description of some 
remains. The Czech compensation system is analyzed; the structure of pay is decomposed 
and commented. Moreover, the legal consequences and institutional characteristics re-
lated to executive remuneration are challenged and the approach of tax optimization su-
premacy criticized. 
 
Abstrakt 
Rigorózní práce popisuje a analyzuje ekonomické aspekty motivace, institucionální pozadí 
a charakteristické vlastnosti manažerů a dále kvalitu správy na podnikové úrovni 
s ohledem na výši a složení odměn manažerů. Model zmocněnec-zmocnitel, model domi-
nance manažerů a model správce prochází postupnou analýzou, aby byly nakonec kriticky 
srovnány. Dále jsou analyzovány dopady multiúrovňového rozhodování a provádění účet-
ních operací za účelem obohacení. 
Praktické části práce jsou zaměřeny na debatu efektů ekonomické transformace v České 
republice a současný vývoj. Podrobně je analyzováno složení celkové odměny manažera. 
Nakonec jsou diskutovány právní aspekty spojené s odměňováním manažerů, institucio-
nální aspekty tohoto odměňování a faktická převaha daňové optimalizace odměňování 
nad motivační složkou. 
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8 Theories on Executive Compensation and Czech Practice 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  MOTIVATION 
Executive compensation has been a subject of research since 1920s. Fifty years 
later Forbes magazine firstly published its classical annual review of CEO pay.1 Cur-
rently, research into the future of compensation professionals indicates that the 
topic is still vital since in coming years more and more importance would be dedi-
cated to executive pay.2 The reason is straightforward. Executive compensation is a 
key point of corporate governance. On the one hand, executive labour is an eco-
nomic factor with fundamental marginal productivity; on the other hand it brings 
extensive (and sometimes spurious) costs. Czech practice may well illustrate these 
substances. The expected full disclosure could push companies into the so-called 
stealth compensation structures that are ineffective and legally questionable. The 
growing derivative market in the Czech Republic asks for better understanding of 
mutual relations and risks between contingent pay and capital markets. Similarly, 
earnings management could become an important issue; even more important 
than it is today. We may assume as well that Czech transition environment indi-
cates some specific institutional factors in executives’ motivation and incentives; 
furthermore, empirical findings may help to adjust the code of best practice to 
these distinctive conditions. Noting just the above reasons, we are convinced that 
the research on executive remuneration in the Czech Republic is needed. 
In concrete, we hypothesize that pay-for-performance relationship is not very tight 
in the Czech Republic. Moreover, the relationship itself is theoretically questionable 
– it is taken for granted in economics that a higher reward results in higher per-
formance. Psychologists, as we will see, do not expect such a simple positive de-
pendence between the reward and individual performance. Especially for the ex-
trinsic reward, the relationship is not always non-decreasing; it does not have to be 
even positive as it is assumed in most remuneration contracts. We also believe that 
some parts of executive pay are the transition period residuum – in some respects 
                                                            
 
1 
O’Reilly and Main (2007) 
2 The Future of the Compensation and Benefits Professions – As Predicted By You (2005), www.haygroup.com 
  
 
1.1. Motivation 9 
resulting even from the planned economy period. Reminding the full disclosure 
once more, we are convinced that it is highly desirable; however, not appropriate at 
the moment in the Czech Republic. We hypothesize as well that whereas the theory 
concentrates on the incentives and motivation, the real world focuses rather on tax 
burden optimization and disclosure tricks. Lastly, we will indicate that the two-tier 
corporate governance model in the Czech Republic results in fact in multiple cen-
tres of control. Such model of control causes economic inefficiencies. Excessive 
executive pay is one of them. 
Hence, the thesis aspires to work in particular with the two following facts – these 
are incentives and intuition. Levitt and Dubner (2005) write about incentives as 
economists’ obsession. And they really are. It is not a coincidence that we normally 
talk about microeconomics and behaviour to emphasize the substance of economics 
as behaviour. 
There are three basic incentives. Of course, they may be positive as well as nega-
tive; however, in the first instance, they are economic, social or moral. Only with 
the full definition you can understand behaviour for which economic (and intuitive) 
reasoning does not have answers. The authors presented an illustrative example of 
parents who regularly delayed picking up their children from a day-care centre. 
Surprisingly, after penalization was imposed on these parents, the delays have even 
increased. 
That is the reason why we would like to go through intuition in economics, too. We 
believe that common sense is the best guide in every-day economic decision-
making. But, economics bears a burden of what we call common knowledge. You 
do not know what string theory is if you are not a theoretical physicist, though, you 
know (or believe) that taxes are too high and petrol is too expensive. This common 
knowledge, on the other hand, brings intuition into decisions where more complex 
thinking would be useful as we could see on the example with the day-care centre. 
Executive compensation theories are based on both our subjects of interest. A 
manager remuneration package is a set of incentives often biased with intuitive – 
but wrong – assumptions (e. g. a higher reward means more effort). Thus, we 
would like to search for working incentives and open a debate over those that are 
intuitively right, although in fact they decrease managers’ performance.  
  
 
10 Theories on Executive Compensation and Czech Practice 
In addition, executive compensation is a popular topic. We feel there is something 
wrong but we are not sure what it is, except that the level of pay is probably too 
high (without a clear definition of such excessiveness). 
How much do CEOs of large companies earn and what for? These are the 
facts nobody knows precisely. However, this should change in the United 
States soon. The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reflects 
complaints of shareholders and struggles for new executive compensa-
tion disclosure rules. It offered a proposal of new stricter rules … and 
wants the rules to come into use in 2007. This could also influence Europe 
which is traditionally less open-minded about compensation. 
Hospodářské noviny, 19 January 2006 
Inappropriate incentive instruments may provoke [executives] to accept 
an exaggerated level of risk instead of being motivated to reasonable risk 
exposure. 
Ihned, 28 January 2008 
 
Reviewing the actual research, papers involving executive compensation in the 
Czech Republic are quite rare. There are three main reasons. Firstly, statistical data 
on Czech executives and their rewards are scarce. Secondly, foreign-owned firms 
usually just copy compensation structures of parent companies. And thirdly, there 
are more important topics which corporate governance research has taken into 
consideration (such as minority shareholders expropriation). The thesis aspires to 
be a starting point for further research. 
1.2.  THESIS STRUCTURE  
After the introduction, chapter two opens with the presentation of basic models 
which describe the behaviour of key players in the compensation settings. In chap-
ter three a compensation package is described, we comment on performance 
measures and their applications as well. Chapter four analyzes different approaches 
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to motivation and behaviour, returns to the transition period and offers some ex-
planations to the recent compensation development. In chapter five legal issues, 
accountability, liability and executive and board member responsibilities are dis-
cussed. Moreover, tax optimization and disclosure consequences are analyzed. 
Chapter six concludes. 
2. MODELS 
Principal-agent, managerial power and stewardship models are the most influential 
approaches describing behaviour of key players in the executive compensation set-
ting process. We will remind their basic features in the following subchapters, 
comment on some distinctions and conclude with the application on Czech reality. 
2.1.  PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL 
Agency models assume risk neutral shareholders (principals) who delegate their 
authority to run the company to risk-averse senior executives (agents). Conyon 
(1997) emphasizes that the key point of the model is in the contracting process. 
Properly set contracts are supposed to align interests of both groups since these 
interests naturally differ. Moreover, both groups operate under existence of infor-
mation asymmetries and moral hazard. One such contractual solution to the asym-
metries is intentional dependency of the executive reward on shareholder returns. 
Originally, the model appeared and was widely-spread by Ross (1973) and Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), respectively.3 Jensen and Murphy (2004) remind that princi-
pals and agents exist in all situations in which more individuals or groups co-
operate in collective activities. Agency costs consist of the sum of monitoring costs 
exercised by principals, bonding costs exercised by agents (in order to ensure prin-
cipals about assumed actions) and residual losses. Körner (2005) sees two classes of 
the agency costs. They are caused both by principals and agents themselves and by 
the overall institutional environment. The former consists mainly of differences in 
                                                            
 
3
 Cited in Abowd (1990): Ross, Stephen A.: The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem. American 
Economic Review, Vol. 63, No. 2, (May, 1973) and Jensen, Michael C. – Meckling, William H.: Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, (October, 
1976) 
  
 
12 Theories on Executive Compensation and Czech Practice 
principals’/agents’ objective functions, in the level of their risk aversion and free 
cash-flow reinvestment motivations. The latter is represented by information 
asymmetries and contract incompleteness. This division gives a nice picture of the 
nature of the principal-agent theory. It offers the ideal basis for description and 
better understanding. 
Objective functions differ for both groups as for any other groups in the company. It 
is natural and it cannot be fully avoided. The theory expects that shareholders are 
much less risk averse than executives since they are assumed to be able to diversify 
their asset portfolios. Executives, on the other hand, are expected to be stuck in a 
given company with their human capital closely tied just to that company. 
The problem of information asymmetries has two basic features. It is not just the 
natural assumption that one party (executives) has a better approach to informa-
tion. The second feature is that executive have control over the information flows 
as well and, hence, they hinder access of principals to the information. Finally, the 
incompleteness of contracts is the most essential sign of the principal-agent rela-
tions (and business generally). It emerges from the uncertainty of future actions 
that may (or may not) be predictable. 
One of the meaningful features of the principal-agent model is its strong mathe-
matical applicability. The following example indicates the common reasoning.4 
We assume risk-averse executives and risk-neutral shareholders. The shareholders’ 
interest is to create an optimal compensation package ),( zxw , where w is total 
compensation, x is the stochastic stock price, and z is a vector of other measurable 
variables. This optimal compensation package has to be such that taking the simple 
form of bxsxw +=)( , where s is a base salary and b is the sharing rate,5 the profit 
for shareholders under incomplete information )()(),( xwaxxw −=pi  is maximized. 
The equation ε+= eea )( , ),0( 2σε N≈  shows the actions taken by executives. 
These actions are unobservable for shareholders. Further, we assume that the ex-
                                                            
 
4
 The presented model is based on Murphy (1999), Gibbons (1998), and Prendergast (1999). 
5
 The so-called pay-performance ratio. The equation may have the form w(z) as well if the explanatory power of 
z is sufficient. 
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ecutive maximizes the utility function )))(,(exp(),( ecwrewu −−= , where r is abso-
lute risk aversion (assumed to be positive), and )(ec  is convex disutility of effort. 
Then the optimal sharing rate is )1/(1 2σcrb ′′+= . This equation shows the trade-
off between risk and incentives. A common outcome is that the higher is the noise 
(or the higher is the executive risk aversion) the weaker should be the sharing ratio. 
Another key point of this reasoning is that the stock price is not the goal itself; 
rather, it is information which helps to find out which actions the executives have 
really taken. 
2.2.  MANAGERIAL POWER MODEL 
The managerial power model works with the same parties as the principal-agent 
model. However, it is weaker in its assumptions since the managerial power model 
does not understand the contracting process as exogenous. It takes the contracting 
as a dynamic endogenous power game. On the other hand, the model breaks the 
clear structure of principal-agent settings and, then, its explanatory power. 
Bebchuk and Fried6 (2003) call the principal-agent approach optimal contracting 
since compensation contracts are seen as a fundamental part of the agency prob-
lem solution. In contrast to the optimal contracting approach, in the managerial 
power model the executive compensation and its structure is viewed as both a par-
tial solution to the agency costs problem and a part of the agency problem itself. 
The latter is the subject of their further research. The authors suppose that the 
managerial power would be naturally expressed in excess pay; moreover, the 
power may distort the overall incentive structure and, hence, corporate perform-
ance. 
Interestingly, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) examined similar issues and got 
similar conclusions. Hence, for us the model naturally belongs among the manage-
rial power models. They called their approach skimming view. The model results 
                                                            
 
6
 The model has been developed and still is being promoted mainly by Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried. 
They especially lead the debate with principal-agent advocates such as Kevin J. Murphy. For reference see 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) or Hall and Murphy (2003). 
  
 
14 Theories on Executive Compensation and Czech Practice 
from the separation of ownership and control when managers got control over the 
paying process itself and, hence, they skim shareholders’ value. There are natural 
constraints for the extraction, such as the total value of a firm, takeover threats, or 
cautiousness about drawing the shareholders’ adverse attention. Beyond these 
limits, the authors assume executives to pay themselves as much as possible.  
The fundamental cause of managerial power is hidden in the process of director 
appointments, where CEOs play usually the most significant roles. The simple 
model of an agency relationship assumes just shareholders and executives. In real-
ity, multiple levels of agency problems exist. The most important one is division of 
the above relationship into the shareholders–board and board–executives rela-
tions. Being a board member bears many positive values. They are expected to get 
attractive salaries and the position itself is tied to social status, prestige, and affilia-
tion. Then, Bebchuk and Fried (2003) add that these members concentrate espe-
cially on the potential re-appointments. Thus, the basic implication assumes board 
members who want to be re-appointed and have control over CEOs pay and CEOs 
who have control over the board member re-appointment process (and, hence, 
their own pay). The authors found factors which significantly increase the CEO 
power. Firstly, it is the operational ineffectiveness of boards. Secondly, it is a higher 
dispersion rate of ownership. And thirdly, it is low institutional investors represen-
tation in boards. Among institutional shareholders, however, we have to distinguish 
between those with no other business relations to the company (pressure resis-
tant), and those further involved in company businesses (pressure sensitive), such 
as banks in a simultaneous creditor position. Only the former may play a significant 
ethicizing role. 
2.3.  STEWARDSHIP MODEL  
Contrary to the economic model of man as presented in the previous models, the 
stewardship model assumes a self-actualizing man. Davis at al. (1997) describe this 
approach as based on the premise that the economic understanding of man limits 
people from a full scope of needs satisfaction. The important conclusion is that 
imposing the economic view on executives (and workers generally) would lead to 
suppressing their level of aspirations. Selfishness is not assumed naturally, it results 
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from the fact that people are treated as if they were selfish. Consequent self-
interested behaviour is expected to spoil potential synergies in the company.7 
The authors continue and describe steward’s behaviour as pro-organizational. 
Stewards naturally maximize the shareholder value because while doing so, they 
maximize their own utility functions. This does not assume a full alignment of prin-
cipal’s and steward’s interests; it just means that the steward places higher value 
on cooperation than on defection. Of course, stewards still have simpler, say, sur-
vival needs. However, generally we can expect to get over this limit and, thus, the 
pro-organizational behaviour naturally prevails. Only corporate governance settings 
which give executives higher authority and discretion may succeed under the stew-
ardship approach. 
Frey and Osterloh (2005) offer a simultaneous model of common pools. They em-
phasize that in stewardship-based models the optimal contracting – even if possi-
ble – could not help to solve the inefficiency by definition. The optimal contracting 
is no longer a solution to the agency problem. These models expect that (under the 
assumption of opportunity behaviour) the optimal contracting itself is the cause of 
agency costs since it treats executives as self-interested individuals who have to be 
bound by contractual constraints. 
The authors see the firm as a set of common pool resources which are collective 
goods in the sense of firm-specific investments. These synergies generate a surplus; 
however, its composition cannot be expressed numerically, and, hence, distributed 
to individual employees based on their individual performance. If we admit exis-
tence of such synergies and believe that these effects are strong, we have to agree 
with Becht at al. (2005) who look for ways how to promote employees’ investments 
in firm-specific human capital. Simply, it has to pay off for executives to invest in 
the firm-specific human capital.  
The problem indicates a social dilemma within the firm. Beside under-investments 
in firm-specific human capital, Frey and Osterloh (2005) spread the list over free-
                                                            
 
7
 The self-actualizing model of man was presented in Argyris, C.: Organization man: Rational and self-
actualizing. Public Administration Review, Vol. 33, (Jul.–Aug., 1973), cited in: Davis at al. (1997) 
  
 
16 Theories on Executive Compensation and Czech Practice 
riding and exploitation of information asymmetries. Thus, firms solve these social 
dilemmas within their own constraints; whereas in the outside world they face a 
common competitive environment. 
Davis at al. (1997) summarize the assumptions under which the executives tend to 
behave rather as stewards than as opportunistic agents. Stewards are motivated by 
higher order needs, they focus on intrinsic incentives. They also identify themselves 
with the company and accept company goals. Moreover, stewards rely on personal 
power in conflicting situation whereas agents rely rather on institutional settings. 
For country-specific assumptions, they found out that stewardship behaviour 
emerges more often in less individualistic societies with a low power distance cul-
ture.8 
Davis at al. (1997) use a classical prisoner’s dilemma model for a description of pos-
sible outcomes. We will present that dilemma illustratively and finish with a few 
comments since the authors are quite inconclusive at this point. 
PICTURE 1: PRISONER’S DILEMMA IN THE PRINCIPAL-EXECUTIVE RELATIONSHIP 
 
If both parties decide to co-operate, they would achieve the only long-term Pareto-
efficient outcome [3,3]. In case that one of the players decides to behave opportu-
nistically and the other behaves in good faith, then the opportunistic player gets 
the best possible outcome, however, the result is not sustainable in the long-run 
since the other player can see both pay-offs. Lastly, we get to the only solution to 
                                                            
 
8 Power distance is defined by the personal justification and assessment of power differences in society.  
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2.4. Comments and Comparison 17 
the prisoner’s dilemma having assumed rational players (in a standard economics 
sense). It is the Nash equilibrium in the fourth quadrant which is sustainable but 
inefficient in the long-run [1,1]. 
As we have written, the authors are quite inconclusive about how to get and stay in 
the first quadrant in the long-run to support theoretically their model. They con-
cluded that just the collectivist orientation of both parties could reach the desired 
outcome. Similarly, Frey and Osterloh (2005) called for the social dilemma to be 
turned into the solution where defection is no longer dominant at the firm level. 
Nevertheless, there are theoretical explanations which could support their ap-
proach. The super-rationality, for instance, assumes that both parties realize the 
possible outcomes and even in the one-shot game choose co-operation. Another – 
classical – approach emphasizes repeated games as a possible solution to the pris-
oner’s dilemma. Although it seems strange for both parties to repeat the action 
(contracting process) again, we may believe that being a lower-level executive in 
the company may simulate such repeated game for both parties and, thus, input 
the learning process. 
2.4.  COMMENTS AND COMPARISON  
We have to realize that the models are to a large extent mutually exclusive. Their 
applicability relies on a given institutional environment and its compliance with 
assumptions of the model. In this respect, we have to concentrate mainly on execu-
tives’ behaviour and board settings. The former would indicate tendencies to be-
have either as agents or as stewards and the latter would indicate power which 
executives may benefit from. Before concluding on Czech environment, we will 
remind both some common features and some characteristics of the models in 
general. 
All the presented models focus primarily on two basic parties. This does not mean 
that no other parties exist. There are different constituencies involved in mutual 
relations beside shareholders and executives, such as creditors, employees, suppli-
ers or clients. To be more descriptive, we have sketched the relationships in a sim-
ple diagram. 
 
  
 
18 Theories on Executive Compensation and Czech Practice 
PICTURE 2: PARTIES RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Thus, analyzing the consequences of executive compensation contracts, we have to 
be careful about possible dynamics among those involved. Besides, the picture indi-
cates that any contractual solutions to the optimization of all interests are sup-
posed to be imperfect. 
Comparing the models, it is the principal-agent approach which focuses primarily 
on optimization. It is strongest in mathematical modelling; on the other hand, this is 
followed by limited assumptions on human behaviour. In the original version, ex-
ecutives were always assumed to be self-interested, rational and risk-averse and 
shareholders, on the other hand, were assumed to be risk-neutral. The model also 
suffers from the missing assumption about biasness in contracting process (mana-
gerial power). And, similarly, it suffers from its practical focus on easily measurable 
performance variables. The model works normally just with the monetary (extrinsic 
and numerical) reward and a direct pay-performance relationship. Thus, as we can 
expect, the strongest conclusions are most criticized. Nevertheless, because of its 
optimization and descriptive aspects, we are convinced that especially in economics 
this approach will keep its leading position among other models. 
The managerial power approach reacts to the exogeneity of contracting process in 
the principal-agent reasoning. Then, the managerial power approach rather argues 
against the principal-agent model; it challenges some of its explanations instead 
bringing completely new ideas. Although it is presented as a separated model, in 
our view it is just a principal-agent-based offshoot. However, indication of how 
strong some principal-agent model assumptions are is one of the significant points 
of the managerial power model. It is the only approach which persuasively shows, 
middle management 
shareholders BoD 
creditors SB 
employees 
blockholders 
executives 
CEO 
non-dispersed ownership 
two-tier system 
when a board member 
under specific circumstances 
  
 
2.4. Comments and Comparison 19 
for example, why executives are awarded for good luck while not being punished 
for bad luck.9 
We may also expect that the managerial power approach would be accompanied 
by camouflaging. This process would be presented by efforts to legitimize and hide 
all excessive compensation practices (and especially those drawing attention). 
The stewardship model opposes another shortcoming in the principal-agent model 
and it is the opportunistic approach to behaviour. Although its opposition is strong 
from many stand-points, it does not offer any solutions for one party to defend 
against potential counterparty’s opportunistic behaviour. By definition, it plays 
permanently with open cards. Then it is not able to analyze any random or inten-
tional counterparty’s misbehaviour. On the other hand, it is positive that the model 
avoids the problem of easily measurable (and misbehaviour attracting) variables. In 
our view, the model correctly opens the important issue of benefits from possible 
cooperative behaviour. But, it fails in conclusive recommendations for practical 
applicability. We have made an effort to summarize and classify the basic aspects of 
given models in table 1. 
TABLE 1: MODELS COMPARISON 
  Agency Model Managerial Power Model Stewardship Model 
Executives Self-interested Self-interested Self-actualizing 
Rationality Rational Rational Bounded 
Behaviour Opportunistic Opportunistic Pro-organizational 
Information asymmetry Executives Executives Mutual 
Contracts Incomplete Incomplete Completeness not desired 
Accountability Shareholder model Shareholder model Stakeholder model 
Contracting Exogenous Endogenous Endogenous 
Incentives preference Extrinsic Extrinsic Intrinsic 
Performance measures Exogenous Endogenous Endogenous 
Psychological contract Transactional Transactional Relational 
Solution Pay-performance alignment Board independency Discretion and trust 
Prisoner's dilemma Nash equilibrium Nash equilibrium Pareto-efficiency possible 
 
For classification of the Czech Republic with respect to the presented models, we 
have used the approach of Davis at al. (1997) and the opinion survey from Večerník 
(1999). Davis at al. (1997) compared countries according to cultural characteristics 
                                                            
 
9 See Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) 
  
 
20 Theories on Executive Compensation and Czech Practice 
and power distance. Japan, for instance, shows signs of a collectivist culture with 
high power distance. The US, on the other hand, are individualistic with low power 
distance. Thus, the expectations about principal-agent or principal-steward behav-
iour are ambiguous. For the Czech Republic, we found a clearer picture. Based on 
Večerník (1999), we classified the Czech Republic as the individualistic society. Re-
spondents in the opinion survey on life success factors placed the highest marks on 
hard work (the highest value at all with more than 75 points from 100). This was 
supported by strong positions of ambitions (73 points), talent (68 points) and higher 
education (55 points).10 Besides, the Czech Republic underwent large – adversely 
perceived – property shifts during the transition period. Therefore, we may charac-
terize the Czech Republic as high power distance society. Then, there are no doubts 
about tendencies to principal-agent behaviour in Czech business. The above theo-
retical conclusions would indicate that wage differences are not understood as de-
served and the opportunistic behaviour prevails. We may assume transactional 
psychological contracts,11 self-interested individuals and Nash equilibrium as the 
solution to given conditions. Moreover, pay-performance alignment may be more 
important in the reward-setting process. 
And finally, we have marked the managerial power model as the offshoot of the 
principal-agent model with endogenous contracting. In our view, this combination 
reflects behaviour of Czech managers even better. They are not just agents – they 
are powerful agents. We will support the hypothesis by the board analysis later in 
the text. At this place we just remark the comparison to Switzerland. The manage-
rial power was mentioned among reasons for high compensation levels there since 
tight social connections resulted in mutual representations of executives in boards 
of other companies.12 This is the consequence of the country size and business in-
                                                            
 
10
 The remaining factor among the highest five was “good contacts” with 72 points. The data are from the year 
1999, however, there was indicated the development in opinions from 1992 and the values do not change 
much (instead higher education which recorded 6-point rise). 
11
 Two fundamental classes of psychological contracts are the transactional contract and the relational con-
tract. The former is defined by concrete assignments with a specified duration and low personal commitment. 
The latter is reversed. 
12
 Challenges to Executive Compensation, Ethical Finance Research Series, Center for Corporate Responsibility 
and Sustainability, University of Zurich, (Nov., 2004) 
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terconnectedness. Only as an unconfirmed remark, we believe that these effects 
may be present in the Czech Republic as well. To summarize, we classify the Czech 
business environment as individualistic, principal-agent driven high power distance 
society with elements of managerial power. 
3. COMPENSATION PACKAGE 
In this chapter we will decompose a usual remuneration package of Czech execu-
tives. Moreover, a relative compensation comparison and some functional relation-
ships will be presented. Based on the literature review and international practice, 
we will conclude on specific Czech risks and characteristics of particular parts of the 
package. 
Analyzing the Czech environment we will result mainly from dispersed data sources 
from newspapers and magazines, annual reports and as the major source from the 
set of publicly unavailable compensation surveys.13 
3.1.  TOTAL COMPENSATION AND BASE SALARY  
The compensation in general has two basic functions – attracting and incentive. 
After hiring the employee, the company has to motivate him/her to concentrate on 
best effort. For top executives this means to create the long-term company value. 
A typical executive reward consists of base salary, bonuses, stock-based compensa-
tion and other non-cash rewards. Non-cash rewards include all kinds of internal 
perquisites (cars, equipment, offices) and external perquisites (associations’ mem-
berships, loans, vacation). Hall and Liebman (1998) emphasize that the base salary 
is determined at the beginning of an annual pay cycle (a fiscal year) whereas the 
bonus part of the compensation is defined at the end of the period. Hence, bonuses 
respond to the actual year performance while the base salary reacts to previous 
periods – if it depends on performance at all. 
                                                            
 
13
 Hay průzkum odměňování vrcholových manažerů (for years 2000 – 2006, formally as TOPEX, Průzkum od-
měňování vedoucích pracovníků), www.haypaynet.com 
  
 
22 Theories on Executive Compensation and Czech Practice 
The following pay-performance relationship of executives in Komerční banka seems 
to confirm the usual compensation setting. Graph 1 shows that the relationship 
between average pay of a member of the board of directors for the given period 
(incl. bonuses based on the previous period performance) and the company profit 
for the same period are quite uncorrelated. However, having the pay composed of 
the base salary for the next period and bonuses for the given period, the correlation 
with the actual company profit is much higher. In fact, the correlation coefficients 
are 0,37 and 0,81, respectively. This could also indicate that the pay-performance 
relationship in the Czech Republic is quite strong. However, the following text re-
veals that the pay is not that correlated with performance of Czech companies in 
general (as it is in this company).14 
GRAPH 1: PAY/SIZE RELATIONSHIP 
 
Source: Komerční banka annual reports (2002 – 2006), author’s calculation 
The structure and level of pay is the result of many variables. The compensation 
depends on company performance measures, compensation plans of competitors, 
tax settings and the emphasis put on contingent pay. Besides, executive compensa-
tion is strongly dependent on the company size (measured as revenues, sales vol-
ume, or the number of employees). Murphy (1999) summarized some findings and 
concluded that the pay-size elasticity was between 0,25 and 0,35 in the 1970s and 
the 1980s in the US. Thus, an executive could expect the compensation as much as 
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 Moreover, the data set in this example is poor and other comparisons (such as for ROAA, ROAE, sole contin-
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double when being in a 3 to 4 times larger company. Conyon (1997) confirmed the 
results while getting just a slightly lower ratio. 
Graph 2 shows the relationship of the company size (measured as the number of 
employees) and the average compensation for Czech members of Supervisory 
Boards.15 Thus, we may expect that company size is positively correlated with com-
pensation. However, with respect to a small sample16 and data variance, we cannot 
conclude how strong the effect is. Moreover, data in annual reports revealed that 
they are inappropriate for any conclusive quantitative studies. We have made an 
effort to confirm the relationship for executives and members of boards of direc-
tors as well. Moreover, we have collected also the value of assets as an alternative 
measure of the company size. All the comparisons did not showed any correlations. 
The annual reports also indicated that disclosure rules in the Czech Republic do not 
allow for unambiguous determination of individual pay of executives and members 
of boards of directors (and due to duality even for the bodies as a whole). 
GRAPH 2: PAY/SIZE RELATIONSHIP 
 
Source: Annual reports (2003) 
Returning to the general pay decomposition, base salaries have two important 
functions. Firstly, the base salary is by definition fixed for a given period and it 
changes little. Thus, it creates the cushion against large pay variations for execu-
tives. Secondly, the base salary is used normally as the basis for other contingent 
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 Annual reports for the year 2003 were the latest with a sufficiently large sample from all we had access to. 
16
 After further selection we used Český telecom, ČEZ, Čepro, Sokolovská uhelná, JME, Středočeská energetická, 
and Komerční banka. 
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24 Theories on Executive Compensation and Czech Practice 
payments (bonuses and stock options). However, the common approach to the 
base salary setting causes some significant difficulties. Murphy (1999) presents that 
the competitive benchmarking based on salary surveys keeps pushing the absolute 
level up since just base salaries over 50th percentile are understood as competitive 
while base salaries under this level are pejoratively presented as below market. 
Such benchmarking may often shadow (or make less sensitive) other important 
aspects of executive performance, such as age, education, experience, job complex-
ity, and the like. Moreover, compensation adjustments to the company size both 
formalize and reinforce the relationship between size and pay; even if there are no 
other reasons than the size itself. 
Analyzing the contingent part of pay, Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) pointed out 
that while providing a partial solution to agency costs between shareholders and 
executives, the contingent pay simultaneously increases agency costs between 
shareholders and creditors. Simply, if executives maximize their pay-offs based on 
alignment with the shareholders’ value then these executives accept in many cases 
a higher level of risk than the creditors would prefer. It is caused by the sharehold-
ers’ convex17 pay-off structure which makes acceptable even projects with negative 
net present value. Similar risk shifting may be possible for other stakeholder groups 
as well. 
Focusing on Czech executives again they prefer a high base salary with low bonuses 
to the sole base salary without bonuses or the minimal salary with high bonuses 
(preferred by just about 7 percent of executives). No executives would ask for con-
tingent pay only. Thus, Czech managers may be characterized by a high level of risk 
averseness. They prefer a guaranteed fixed reward and just minor contingent re-
muneration.18 (This minor performance related part of pay helps to promote per-
ception of justice among employees – although a relatively small difference in the 
reward, higher effort means higher pay.)19 
                                                            
 
17
 Actually, there is no residual value for shareholders until all the creditors’ requirements are met. 
18
 The sample is biased to younger executives within both top and middle management. See 
www.pruzkumy.com. 
19 [15] Jana Bardyová, HR Management, 27. 1. 2006 
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Eriksson (2005)20 gathered data for 600 CEOs and looked for dependency of indi-
vidual characteristics (such as age, sex, education) and firm characteristics (owner-
ship) on the total compensation of Czech executives. 
The results showed that CEO pay depends in the first instance on the education and 
ownership. A university degree may increase the compensation for as much as 
about 50 percent. Foreign majority of ownership is the second most influential fac-
tor (46 percent higher pay compared to domestic private firms). Besides, men are 
expected to get about 37 percent higher pay than women. (Since the values are 
controlled for other individual and firm characteristics, the numbers indicate persis-
tent gender inequality rather than selection bias.) 
In the following paragraph, we will focus on a foreign/domestic executive pay com-
parison. Table 2 shows data on the relative pay differences among selected levels of 
executives and the same with respect to their nationality. Thus, we may see that 
being a foreign CEO means about 64 percent higher pay compared to Czech CEOs. 
Comparing the other managerial levels with respect to nationality, the differences 
get lower with a lower managerial rank. Moreover, the relative differences among 
Czech managers are lower than among foreign managers. Simply, the variability in 
pay is not that strong for Czech managers. 
                                                            
 
20
 We have made a huge effort to update the data set as for the year 2006. The interview in Trexima, Zlin re-
vealed, however, that prof. Eriksson’s research was covered by a meaningful grant which enabled to detach 
given employees just for data mining and cleaning. Thus, we have failed in this respect. 
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TABLE 2: DOMESTIC/FOREIGN PAY COMPARISON 
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I level (CZ) 100 80 63 68 
II level (CZ) 125 100 79   67   
CEOs (CZ) 158 126 100 61 
I level (foreign) 146     100 78 57 
II level (foreign) 150 128 100 73 
CEOs (foreign)     164 176 138 100 
(in %) 
Source: Hay Group 2006, author's calculation 
Without going into detail, the domestic/foreign pay differences may be explained 
by the selection bias (the foreign investors naturally invest into more profitable 
companies which allows for higher pay levels) and different reference markets. 
3.2.  PERFORMANCE MEASURES  
To begin, we will quote Nell Minow21 who comments on motivational aspects of 
contingent pay. She confesses that contingent pay may be highly motivational: 
We just have to be a little more thoughtful about what it is we’re asking 
them to motivate. 
 
For principal-steward relationships based on trust, where non-contingent payments 
prevail, the significance of performance measures is lower. Where focused on a 
contingent part in the contracting process, the performance measures become 
much more significant. Then, two qualities have to be analyzed. Firstly, we have to 
find out if the performance measures are correlated with executives’ effort and, 
secondly, how easily they can be manipulated. In concrete, we are particularly in-
                                                            
 
21 Nell Minow from the Corporate Library specializes in corporate governance, cited in Becht at al. (2005). 
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terested in their signal-to-noise ratio, targeting process settings, multitasking impli-
cations, and easiness of measures to be abused in earnings management. 
We have to realize that performance measures are not primarily the compensation 
instruments. In companies, financial and accounting ratios and variables fulfil all 
possible duties (reporting, accounting, financial management and budgeting, plan-
ning, tax and other purposes). For their incentive functions the most important 
feature is the signal-to-noise ratio. The ratio captures information about actions the 
executives have chosen, thus, it captures information on performance purged from 
random noise. In addition to basic measures, a set of new accounting-based meas-
ures have emerged in financial management. Those are Stern Stewart’s Economic 
Value Added (EVA), BCG’s Total Business Return (TBR), or McKinsey’s Economic 
Profit. Garvey and Milbourn (2000b) state that among other measures, such as 
ROC, ROE, or growths in EPS and cash flow, EVA was found to have the highest sta-
tistical correlation with the shareholders’ value creation (dividends and capital 
gains). Of course, we could ask why just stock returns are not used as the perform-
ance measure. The reason for using measures like EVA is that stock returns are 
noisy and at least in short-term it is a misleading measure of value creation. EVA 
may also be useful for highly diversified firms for which a single stock price does not 
offer much performance information since it is too general. Moreover, not all com-
panies are publicly traded. 
We will discontinue the review at this place with some statistical data. Table 3 
shows that performance measures in the Czech Republic are tied to three basic 
classes mostly – to company level measures, division or unit level measures and 
individual efficiency measures. At a company level net income, EBIT, turnover, mar-
ket share, ROE, ROA, EVA and stock prices are the most applied performance meas-
ures. Safety in work, productivity or number of sick days belong among individual 
measures.22 
                                                            
 
22 Based on interviews with HR managers. 
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TABLE 3: GENERAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
Measures 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Company level 78 n.a. 88 89 82 83 
Individual 22 n.a. 79 81 68 58 
Division/unit level x n.a. 41 54 68 63 
Discretionary x n.a. 8 12 9 8 
Other (parent company level) x n.a. 8 3 0 8 
(Not mutually exclusive) (in %) 
(Results for top management. CEOs give higher emphasis on company-level measures 
and lower on division/unit-level measures.) 
Source: Hay Group 2001 – 2006 
Garvey and Milbourn (2000b) add that whereas it is quite easy to measure noise 
(volatility) of a performance variable, it is much more difficult to catch the signal 
content. Supposing we could find measures that are perfectly correlated with ex-
ecutives’ effort, we still face other important issues. Eisenberger and Cameron 
(1996) draw from learned industriousness theory and claim that individuals can 
(and do) learn the structure of rewards; they realize which dimensions of perform-
ance are preferred and allocate their activities based on such given preferences. 
Similarly, Prendergast (1999) claims the same for multitasking processes. We are at 
risk that executives do not maximize the long-term company value. Instead, they 
tend to maximize the most compensated performance measures. Moreover, the 
inconsistency between accounting measures and economic reality pushes execu-
tives to invest in short-term projects with immediate returns and distant cost pay-
ments and the other way around. This is the case of R&D which brings costs imme-
diately, however, the profit comes later, if ever.23 
Further, it is important to emphasize that contingent compensation depends 
strongly on negotiated performance standards and budgeted values. Michal Jensen 
talks in this respect about executives’ benefits from lying.24 Negotiated lower stan-
dards and larger budgets mean less effort for executives when getting over these 
standards. 
                                                            
 
23
 Such behaviour was confirmed in Rehnert (1985), Riceman at al. (2000) or Jensen and Murphy (2004). 
24
 Performance target negotiation at the firm level, in our view, will draw more attention in future. For more 
information see Jensen, Michael C.: Paying People to Lie: the Truth about the Budgeting Process. European 
Financial Management, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2003 
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Discussing the performance measures in executive compensation, we have to real-
ize one important aspect. We have to distinguish between maximization of the 
measures that bring the highest bonuses (and other contingent rewards) and earn-
ings management. Where the former operates under legal limits, the latter goes 
beyond. Both activities are inefficient from a company point of view; but just the 
earnings management is fraud. Riceman at al. (2000) define the earnings manage-
ment as a purposeful activity which pursues to get some private gains due to inter-
ventions in the external financial reporting processes. 
Murphy (1999) summarizes all kinds of potential ways how to manipulate perform-
ance measures. Executives can bias the budgeting process to adjust performance 
standards. They can select such competitors’ actions which decrease the peer 
group standards. They can keep shifting accounting results (this is especially the 
case of accounting accruals). Moreover, executives can adjust their daily actions to 
be at the top (or at a minimum level) when values of measures are recorded for 
compensation purposes. They can inflate or deflate earnings artificially. And they 
also can invest in short-term actions with immediate returns and avoid long-run 
growth investments (such as the above R&D example). 
But, Lev (2003) confirms that manipulations do not have to be the exclusive result 
of executives’ self-serving. Managers believe by definition that their business, if in 
troubles, would get better again and they have to keep that alive until better times 
emerge. To continue funding and supplies, they have to report the numbers as for 
the firm in no downturn. The support of business partners is critical. Moreover, 
bonds and loans often include strict covenants which may enable creditors to take 
control over the firm. Jensen and Murphy (2004) also blame some institutional as-
pects of capital markets. When firm’s earnings beat the consensus analyst forecast, 
the stock price increased by 5,5 %. On the other hand, non-beating meant fall by 
5,05 %. Surprisingly, for perfect fit the stock price increased by 1,63 %. This indi-
cates that capital markets punish firms which do not meet analysts’ forecast with 
no respect to ill implications it may create. Nevertheless, executive’s personal re-
sponsibility has to be always required. The fraudulent activities may lead to justifi-
able public regulations. This was the example of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US, 
for instance. 
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To sum up, we have to always keep in mind that contingent pay (based on different 
ways how to measure performance) is subject to multiple trade-off effects. We 
have indicated that instead of promoting effort, value decreasing (and even fraudu-
lent) activities are often provoked. We may conclude with Kerr (1975) who summa-
rized two basic causes of inefficiencies, in our view similar for both multitasking and 
earnings management. The above debate has shown that despite their simplicity 
they have still been valid. These are the fascination with an objective criterion and 
the overemphasis on highly visible behaviour. The former means looking for simple, 
quantifiable standards which may be efficient when rewarding elementary and 
predictable activities; however, they may cause goal displacements when applied 
on more sophisticated activities. The latter shows that rewarding hardly observed 
activities (such as team-building or creativity) in the same manner as those quanti-
fiable fails. 
3.3.  BONUSES 
Bonuses are the most usual and historically settled variable incentives. Although 
fine tuned for different companies, they are quite uniform and compact across 
economies (Murphy, 1999). Bonuses can be categorized based on performance 
measures, performance standards and functional relationships between perform-
ance and rewards. 
Generally, most bonus plans are shaped around thresholds. Until a bottom thresh-
old is achieved no bonus is paid. After reaching this boarder a given minimum 
amount is paid and the amount keeps increasing with respect to an increasing per-
formance measure. The pay-off is usually frozen after achieving a cap threshold. 
The thresholds are expressed prevalently as a percentage of a performance stan-
dard. Further, the bottom and the cap levels are percentages of a target bonus. The 
varying part is often called the incentive zone. For better understanding, see the 
graphical illustration. 
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PICTURE 3: BONUS STRUCTURE 
 
Source: Murphy (1999) 
Usually, bonuses are a sum of sub-bonuses where each of them has its own per-
formance standard and a specific functional relationship. The accounting perform-
ance measures are mostly revenues, net income, pre-tax income, EBIT or EVA. Of-
ten, ratios and growth measures are used, such as EPS, growth in EPS, ROA, ROE, or 
the income/sales ratio. 
Performance standards are expressed with respect to budgeted amounts, growth 
levels vis-à-vis the previous year, or they are discretionary as set by the board. 
Sometimes, they follow peer groups performance or they are fixed for a given pe-
riod. The incentive zone is usually described as the 80/120 plan. The numbers are 
percentages of the target standard as for the bottom and cap thresholds. There is a 
number of different approaches including 90/110, 70/130 and other ratios.25 
As far as the Czech practice is concerned, executives receive the bonuses once a 
year usually, the actual level is expressed as a portion of the base salary in 90 per-
cent of examples (in 80 percent of examples exclusively for CEOs).26 Based on fig-
                                                            
 
25
 Most descriptions come from Murphy (1999) where you can find a comprehensive statistical part about 
percentages of standards and measures used. 
26 [6] Hospodářské noviny, 9. 10. 2006 and Hay průzkum odměňování vrcholových manažerů (2006) 
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ures in table 4 we can see that almost all Czech companies offer a certain bonus 
plan. 
TABLE 4: COMPANIES PAYING-OFF BONUSES 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Bonuses 81 98 95 97 97 82 93 
(in %) 
Source: Hay Group 2000 – 2006 
In addition, about 30 percent of companies offer an additional payment of profit 
sharing. Contrary to common bonuses, the profit sharing is rather discretionary 
based on the decisions of a board of directors. 
Application of a single measure bonus plan is exceptional; normally multiple-
measure bonus plans are used. The full package then behaves as a set of single 
bonus plans. 
PICTURE 4: CZECH BONUS SCHEME 
A target median bonus for top management is 30 percent of the base salary (and 34 
percent for CEOs). A bonus cap is just a little higher for top managers whereas for 
CEOs the range is more flexible (see picture 4).27 About 10 percent of companies 
pay a symbolic value of about 3 percent of the base salary even if the bottom 
                                                            
 
27 Based on the data from Hay průzkum odměňování vrcholových manažerů (2006) 
Performance 
Measure 
Annual Bonus 
3 % 
10 % of companies 
30/34 % 
35/48 % 
  
 
3.4. Stock-Based Remuneration 33 
threshold is not achieved. Czech bonus payments are significantly lower compared 
to German top managers, for instance. Their target bonus is set at the 100 percent 
value of the base salary. On the other hand, in Norway or Sweden it is just about 25 
percent.28 
Besides the one-year bonus plans there are so-called long-term incentive plans (LTI, 
LTIPs) based on three to five years rolling-average cumulative performance meas-
ures. These bonus plans are considered to avoid some shortcomings related espe-
cially to earnings management. However, their usage in the Czech Republic is quite 
rare. 
TABLE 5: LONG-TERM BONUSES 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 
Long-term bonuses 11 6 4 13 
(in %) 
Source: Hay Group 2003 – 2006 
Thus, for top managers the incentive zone is quite short and the payment scheme 
seems to be reduced largely to a bivalent zero-one model. We may expect that in 
this structure the incentive component diverts partly from promoting the long-term 
effort to a simple cross of a performance threshold. In this way, the usual bonus 
plan in the Czech Republic rather provokes than moderates the earnings manage-
ment. 
3.4.  STOCK-BASED REMUNERATION 
The level of compensation became a social and political issue at the beginning of 
the 1990s in the US. It did not seem appropriate for executives to get such high 
remuneration without stronger alignment of pay to company performance. Contin-
gent pay began to be seen as the best cure. Among, stocks and stock-based incen-
tive instruments became prominent. 
We had to wait one decade to realize that there are not just positive aspects and 
that adverse effects may be substantial. Stock options were identified as a typical 
                                                            
 
28 [2] Aleš Jirec, Ihned, 25. 9. 2006 
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biased incentive which substantially contributed to many corporate scandals (En-
ron, WorldCom or Xerox). Frey and Osterloh (2005) are convinced that the whole 
situation even changed public opinions on managers and their roles in companies 
and society. 
At first, we will describe stock options in general. Option contracts in executive 
compensation allow managers to buy a given number of shares at a specified fixed 
(or conditional) price. Most often these are so-called American options with option 
rights exercisable any time before the maturity. However, the right to exercise the 
options before is strongly limited by vesting restrictions. Hall and Murphy (2003) 
also emphasize that after options are exercised, the company issues new shares 
usually; hence, the number of shares outstanding is increased.29 Moreover, execu-
tives do not pay for call options often; rather they get the value of spread between 
the market price and the pre-specified exercise price when the option is vested. 
In theory, the exercise price may be set relatively to the industry index, the matur-
ity may be contracted for the expected executive tenure and the option contract 
may be forfeited unless a given stock price is reached (Murphy, 1999). Most often, 
there are no such specific conditions. 
Especially due to stock options, the executive compensation in the US skyrocketed 
in the second half of the 1990s. The following graph offers a comparison of average 
CEO pay in 350 top companies with average worker pay. 
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 This stock dilution has drawn more and more shareholders’ attention when the option contracts became 
substantial at the end of the 1990s. 
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GRAPH 3: CEO/AVERAGE PAY RELATION 
 
Source: Institute for Policy Studies (in: www.csmonitor.com) 
Then, there are two main questions. Why the increase in stock options had been so 
strong and why the options were not granted with the exercise price based on in-
dustry or other specific indexes. 
Jensen and Murphy (2004) explained that the increase of options used in executive 
compensation followed debates about an insufficient contingent part of remunera-
tion in the 1980s. Recommendations to change this practice from both scholars and 
(institutional) investors were a natural response. This was supported by the prefer-
ential disclosure and tax rules whose impact on both the increase in option con-
tracts and use of non-indexed options was straightforward. Bebchuk and Fried 
(2001) also add that a significant part of the increase should be attributed to the 
managerial power. Although most probable, this is hard to be confirmed with con-
clusive data. 
As a result, stock options have become less applied in compensation packages. Tully 
(2006) shows that there has been a substantial substitution trend in stock options 
for restricted stocks in recent years. This has been caused both by the corporate 
scandals and long-announced changes in reporting.30 Nevertheless, the practice 
shows that legal requirements have still not been enforced fully.31 
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In the following text, we will describe Czech practice and compare the situation 
with the above US case. As a result, some risks will occur. 
Long-term contingent pay is subject to three significant forces in the Czech Repub-
lic. It seems to be a mixture of managerial power, camouflaging and copying of for-
eign compensation patterns (without more profound understanding and adjust-
ments). 
Using stock-based instruments assumes having a mature capital market. However, 
this has not been the case in the Czech Republic. The stock prices are still influ-
enced rather by portfolio investors trading than by the intrinsic value of a com-
pany.32 In spite of that about 20 percent of companies in the Czech Republic offer 
stock options. Discount company shares and shares given free of charge are less 
popular (see table 6). 
TABLE 6: STOCK-BASED REWARD 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 
Stock options 14 19 21 17 
Discount company shares 8 6 7 7 
Company shares free of charge 5 6 n.a. n.a. 
(Not mutually exclusive.) (in %) 
   Source: Hay Group 2003 – 2006 
In most cases Czech executives get at-the-money options. The maturity is about 2 – 
3 years and the payment is not guaranteed (for the payment the executive is ex-
pected to be employed in the company at the maturity date for instance). In 2005 
about 60 percent of required shares were bought in the secondary market. The 
remaining 40 percent were newly issued shares. Thus, the stock dilution exists and 
may be quite strong in some cases. Normally, the stock options are not indexed and 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
and disclose retirement benefits. In December 2006 some additional changes occurred in stock option disclo-
sure rules. In media it has still been discussing if these changes enhance or mitigate the rules (January 2008). 
Moreover, since 2006 US GAAP require stock options being fully expensed in accounting for reporting pur-
poses. See www.marketwatch.com. 
31 
For instance the SOX disclosure requirement that executive option grants have to be reported to the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission within two business days have not been embraced by all companies. Backdating 
of option grants decreased significantly, however, focusing on the issue could still improve the overall situation. 
32 [17] Erich Handl, Hospodářské noviny, 15. 12. 2003 
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executives may get even options with shares of a different company as an underly-
ing asset (mainly companies in group).33 
Thus, we may see that just common stock options are used in executive compensa-
tion. Their potential incentive functions are largely unrecorded. No indexed-like 
options are offered, we cannot see out-of-the-money options or options aligned to 
company performance measures. The question is if it results from managerial 
power of just from low awareness. If we realize that stock options bear higher risk 
of camouflaging their further expansion in the Czech Republic is debatable at the 
moment. Simply, we believe that it is desirable to keep the percentage of stock 
options in compensation at this low (or even lower) level before the institutional 
background gets more mature (this means especially development of the capital 
market, business ethics and awareness of stock option incentive functions in com-
pensation). 
In addition, using of stock options in executive compensation had some specifics in 
state-owned companies. There is a list of those which faced public critique with 
respect to the level and structure of compensation, such as Škoda Plzeň, Komerční 
banka, Český telecom or ČEZ. Some of their managers explained that working for a 
state-owned company brings distinctive risks. If a firm goes bankrupt it may be dif-
ficult for a manager to find a new job, moreover there is political risk of being made 
redundant without any economic reasons. However, we have to oppose since the 
risk of decreased human capital after unsuccessful mission is common for both the 
managers in state-owned and private firms. Moreover, the managers saw them-
selves partly as privatization managers which expects higher pay for a limited pe-
riod. But, the remuneration also went up in those state-owned companies which 
were not expected to be sold in future.34 
This was not the case of abovementioned companies; almost all have already been 
privatized. ČEZ is the most important from the remaining and may help to illustrate 
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 Hay průzkum odměňování vrcholových manažerů (2005, 2006) 
34 [16] Marek Pražák, Mladá Fronta Dnes, 16. 12. 2003 
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two distinctive features concerning stock-based instruments in executive compen-
sation.35 
Firstly, it is the role which may play consulting companies. The stock option plan 
was launched in 2001 in ČEZ and it was prepared by renowned lawyers White & 
Case. After the public objections, the case was described as standard with refer-
ences that it was an external company who prepared the package. Thus, this proves 
that in some cases the external consulting firms just cover the debatable opera-
tions.36 Secondly, it is the power of public opinion. After the issue started to be 
discussed publicly, the board of directors (as the state principal in the company) 
changed the rules of using stock options significantly. Nevertheless, the whole 
process was rather unsystematic. It indicated that the main effect was to muffle the 
public voice.37 
3.5.  OTHER REWARDS 
Composing the total compensation package you have two basic approaches. Firstly, 
the compensation may consist of the cash reward prevalently. However, the micro-
economic utility function indicates that this composition would face a significant 
decreasing marginal utility. On the other hand, costs of service are low since the 
simple structure does not ask for sophisticated administration. Secondly, the pack-
age may be more complex, the cash reward would be supplemented with all kinds 
of especially non-cash remuneration. In its simple form the composed utility is ex-
pected to be higher than the utility of the sole payment.38 However, we may expect 
that the costs of administration of such complex rewards would be much higher. 
Thus, the optimized ratio of cash and non-cash reward exists where both variables 
– the total executive’s (employee’s) utility and administrative costs – are in the 
optimal proportions.39 The Czech practice follows the global trend of more and 
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 Short time before Český telecom underwent similar changes. 
36
 [9] Ihned, 4. 1. 2007 
37
 [8] Ihned, 3. 1. 2007 
38
 For a complex description see Skořepa, M.: Zpochybnění deskriptivnosti teorie očekávaného užitku. IES 
Working Paper 7/2006, IES FSV, Charles University, (2006) 
39 There is another key point in the real world and it is a given tax policy. 
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more complex compensation packages 
ferent cash and non-cash 
In the remaining part of the chapter, we will just describe the structure of benefits 
in the Czech Republic. 
Czech executives. A company car is a basic benefit for almost all top managers.
Company cars belong among rewards where the direct comparison of Czech ma
agers to the European ones equals largely.
extra leave and 60 and 70 percent get extra medical care and contribution
state-subsidised retirement plans, respectively. Besides, about half of executives 
get contribution to life insurance and extra sick payments.
Source: Hay Group 2002 
According to the Sarbanes
receive any company loans based on bad experience from the past. Kodex (2004) 
recommends the same practice for Czech executives, nevertheless, these are just 
recommendations and the corporate law allows for such operations after the ge
eral meeting’s approval. Loans to executives in the Czech Republic are in 40 percent 
non-interest loans, the usual amount is TCZK 100 and the payment period five 
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and composes the remuneration from
rewards.40 
Graph 4 shows the most represented perquisites in use for 
41 About 85 percent of executives 
42 
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years. The rest of the loans are interest bearing loans, nevertheless, the interest 
rate is significantly under comparable market rates. In this case the median amount 
is TCZK 550.43 
4. EXECUTIVES 
4.1.  INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC MOTIVATION 
Analyzing the compensation package, we could notice that extrinsic rewards domi-
nated any compensation considerations. Frey and Osterloh (2005) remind a simple 
fact of more complex incentives where intrinsic motivation is included. The intrinsic 
motives are a natural and permanent part of human consideration and behaviour. 
People may find utility in activities themselves, they may wish to comply with social 
standards as well. Spreier at al. (2006) discussed also basic motives of corporate 
leaders. These were achievement (efforts to reach socially acknowledged stan-
dards), affiliation (building good personal relations), and power (efforts to influence 
others). The key point is, nonetheless, that institutions play a fundamental role in 
intrinsically motivated behaviour – in its quality and scope. 
Davis at al. (1997) distinguish an extrinsic and intrinsic reward mainly from tangibil-
ity and valuation stand-points. Whereas extrinsic rewards are tangible, exchange-
able commodities that have their market values, intrinsic rewards are rather im-
measurable, hard to be quantified values, such as opportunities for growth and self-
actualization. 
We would not care much about mutual relations of motivation theories if they all 
show direct non-rivalrous positive effects. This is not the case, unfortunately. Stan-
dard economics uses the traditional behaviourist approach. Based on unpleasant or 
neutral activities (work), the disutility is balanced by positive rewards to produce 
required results (performance). Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) return to the cogni-
tive psychology school which challenged this approach stating that intrinsic motiva-
tion, which is independent of extrinsic rewards, is in some cases partially replaced 
by these rewards. The overall effect may still be positive, nevertheless, if measur-
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able, we get a traditional trade-off relationship once again. In extreme positions the 
standard economics could face a highly undesirable implication where the (mone-
tary, measurable) reward may result in the overall decrease in performance. 
Kidder and Buchholtz (2002) present that executives work under relational psycho-
logical contracts, prevalently. They are responsible for running the entire company; 
their work includes all kinds of distinctive roles – decision-making, personal leading, 
information dissemination. The authors claim that violations of the relational psy-
chological contract would lead to reduction in executives’ stewardship. 
As we have written above, extrinsic incentives may have a detrimental effect on the 
overall activity since they balance intrinsic motives. This effect is called crowding-
out. Frey and Osterloh (2005) listed empirical tests which confirmed the existence 
of the crowding-out effect.44 The authors presented that paying for blood donation 
may reduce total supply. It has also been tested that people reduced their support 
for a local nuclear waste repository after the monetary reward was offered. Simi-
larly, environmental charges have little effects when destroying natural efforts to 
protect the environment. The reward may also disturb the social norm of reciproc-
ity (the so-called partial gift exchange theory). And lastly, people show a lower par-
ticipation in voluntary work when they are paid since this contradicts the social 
contribution needs. Davies at al. (1997) add that a simple fact of being controlled 
could have a similar impact on decrease in intrinsic motivation. 
Nevertheless, based on the psychological contract there is crowding-in effect as 
well. People show that the pro-social behaviour may be reaction to other than ex-
trinsically motivated responses. Frey and Osterloh (2005) claim that people adhere 
to laws generally and accept the decisions of legitimate authorities. (This example 
shows that board legitimacy and authority may play a significant role in duties set-
tings.) 
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The authors also confirmed that crowding-out is stronger for monetary than for 
symbolic rewards. It is also stronger for expected rewards and for decisions which 
are more complex and, thus, require a higher level of discretionary behaviour. 
There are also critiques which share our objections to the excessive generalization. 
Eisenberger and Cameron (1996) claim that the above results are highly conditional 
and could be avoided to a large extent. A more thorough approach to testing 
should bear less conclusive results. They came to the conclusion that the detrimen-
tal effects of rewards are confirmed for the only example of expected performance-
independent tangible reward. For all, quality-dependent and completion-dependent 
expected tangible rewards and for verbal rewards the detrimental effects on per-
formance were not verified. Moreover, in their later work the authors confirm that 
quality-dependent reward increases interest in the activity and has no or positive 
effect on time spent (attitudinal and free-time measures, Eisenberger and Cam-
eron, 1998). 
To conclude, intrinsic motivation seems to play a significant role (although different 
opinions of the scope exist). Moreover, there are likely to be immeasurable effects 
of breaking the relational psychological contract between executives and principals. 
Further, we found intriguing and useful results in Gneezy and Rustichini’s (2000) 
empirical research. The authors show that there is a discontinuity of performance in 
rewards at the zero level. For small monetary rewards they found a reduction in 
performance in comparison to no compensation (or when no compensation had 
been suggested). Moreover, this result contradicts the assumption that higher re-
wards are accompanied by lower variance in the subsequent level of activity. The 
discontinuity indicates that the higher variance for lower rewards may be explained 
just by this discontinuity. The most striking fact is, further, that people are not 
aware about this zero-level discontinuity. Generally, people appear to take the pay-
performance relations as monotonic where a higher reward means a higher level of 
performance. The examples presented in this chapter confirm that intuitively ac-
cepted compensation decisions may bring unexpected – even perverse – results. 
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4.2.  PLANNED ECONOMY AND AFTER  
The Czech Republic has still been included in emerging countries.45 Logically, we can 
expect that all kinds of markets have not approached the operational level in com-
parison to advanced economies. This is the case of the labour market with execu-
tives and other institutional aspects (mainly legal) as well. Thus, we may believe 
that based on path dependency some of analyzed issues are anchored in the proc-
ess of transition. 
Before 1990 executives did not focus on standard efficiency measures. In a word, 
they faced monetary and promotion incentives which depended on firm perform-
ance, plan fulfilment and political loyalty (Djankov and Murrell, 2002).46 Moreover, 
Eriksson at al. (2000) emphasize that the centrally planned system in Czechoslova-
kia faced the highest wage-levelling among the CEE countries and, on the other 
hand, the highest inequality in earnings with respect to gender. The rigidity of 
economy resembled the Soviet planning system more than in comparable coun-
tries. For larger companies in our scope, there was the only possible pattern of pro-
prietorship – the state owned-property. At the beginning of the transition period 
and shortly after starting the privatization process, there were few executives well-
endowed with skills required for market economy (Claessens and Djankov, 1999). In 
addition, Clark and Soulsby (1996) remind that those managers who survived the 
initial change spread and internalised an artificial simplification which distinguished 
professionals (who could operate in any political systems because of managing 
skills) from the others (who could work only due to party affiliation). There is no 
surprise that just those who kept holding their positions included themselves in the 
former group and, hence, justified the survival. Without any judgements, for our 
analysis it is important to notice that the executives were able to prolong the eco-
nomic privileges from the communist era to the period after. They converted the 
preferential access to property, goods and services into cash remuneration. The 
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 See for instance Morgan Stanley Emerging Market Index, http://www.mscibarra.com. 
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 Cited in (Paligorova, 2005): Djankov, S. – Murrell, P.: Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative 
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economic benefits of managerial élite were always present, however, separation 
from the planning centre made it possible to monetarise them. 
Večerník (1999) specified the conditions on the labour market and called the model 
as a revolution of deputies. Since the general manager positions were understood 
more political than others in centrally-planned companies, the second wave of 
leaders – the deputies – became a majority among new CEOs and board members. 
Moreover, the situation of transition economies faced an insufficient definition of 
property rights, thus, the Czech Republic became a managerial system where direc-
tors of banks and investment funds were able to shape the whole economy. 
Clark and Soulsby (1996) collected data for one Czech industrial company47 and 
showed that the compensation for senior managers increased by 102,5 percent in 
the period 1993–1994 in comparison to 31 and 34,5 percent for middle managers 
and workers, respectively. After further analysis, they concluded that the increase 
was relatively low compared to other enterprises. 
Besides, we have to outline development of ownership structures in the Czech Re-
public in brief to understand a fundamental institutional background. Mejstřík 
(2005) reminds that voucher privatization was expected to create an environment 
of dispersed ownership which would gradually develop into the Anglo-Saxon corpo-
rate governance structures. Nevertheless, it became clear immediately that such 
development would not be probable with the emergence of investment privatiza-
tion funds. Although there existed regulations48 which should have lowered the 
ownership concentration, further development showed that no such thing hap-
pened. Later, two official privatization waves were followed by massive ownership 
changes in 1995 – 1996. This third wave was unregulated, uncontrolled, mainly 
beyond the official markets and led in huge swaps of controlling bulks of shares. 
Mejstřík (1999) offered a model of shareholders’ behaviour where a large share-
holder behaves as a single owner. This zero-one model allowed just for two accept-
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 Jesenické strojírny. 
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 An investment privatization fund could not have more than 20 percent of shares in one company; moreover, 
it was not allowed to invest more than 10 percent of assets into one enterprise. 
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able forms of ownership – nothing or a controlling majority. This was confirmed by 
capital markets since after announcement of the received majority, the share prices 
fell down in most cases. The fall resulted from expected different ways of minority 
shareholders expropriation. Even in Kodex (2004)49 we can read about a Czech vi-
cious practice when majority shareholders appoint board members in order to fol-
low their interests exclusively. Richter (2005) lists self-dealing, corporate opportu-
nity capturing and direct stealing as examples of usurpation of private benefits of 
control. 
In 2005 the median ownership percentage of the largest voting block reached more 
than 77 percent for 55 companies listed on the Prague Stock Exchange. The second 
largest (block of) shareholder(s), similarly, got incomparable 11 percent. Compared 
to developed countries, majorities were usual in Austria, Belgium, Germany and 
Italy as well. Nevertheless, the concentration never got over 60 percent (Mejstřík, 
2005).50 The analysis has shown that the ownership concentration is extraordinarily 
high in the Czech Republic and the ownership structure does not resemble the An-
glo-Saxon model as it had been calculated at all. 
Lastly, we have to mention the structure of shareholders from domestic/foreign 
point of view. At the beginning of transition, the model of domestic privatization 
was taken for granted. Nevertheless, diverting from further description we can 
conclude that foreign capital has become dominant in the Czech economy. Based 
on Czech Statistical Office (CZSO) data, foreign owned companies hold about 32 
percent of enterprise units and creates about 54 percent of revenues.51 Most inves-
tors are from Germany and Austria (even though statistically investors from the 
Netherlands keep the highest portion).52 
To conclude with compensation data, during the transformation period the lowest 
percentile of employees with respect to earnings did not fall down compared to the 
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 Data for the year 2001. 
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 For 2Q 2006, companies with more than 100 employees. 
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mean value. To the contrary, the highest percentile earns as much as 25 percent of 
total income.53 This confirms the above comments on the rocketing increase in ex-
ecutive compensation. 
4.3.  FLUCTUATIONS AND RELATIVE COMPENSATION 
In this subchapter, we will theoretically support consequences of executive fluctua-
tion and show on Czech data that this may be a significant force behind the recent 
compensation development. Moreover, a relative comparison of remuneration in 
the economy will be presented. In this respect, notice the lower order digits com-
pared to the US compensation comparison presented above. In addition to data 
sources presented in the third chapter, Czech Statistical Office data and data col-
lected for the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs54 are used. 
Murphy and Zabojnik (2003)55 confirmed empirically that CEOs hired from outside 
are supposed to get higher pay than those promoted internally. We may support 
this conclusion for Czech executives who specified in the opinion survey that the 
increase in pay must be significant when changing the employer. For all-level man-
agement the increase should be higher then TCZK 10. Accordingly, for top managers 
the increase has to be much higher. In a word, the turnover is naturally aligned with 
a positive jump in compensation (and stronger for external hiring than internal 
promotion).56 
Table 7 shows that the structure of executives has been changing crucially in the 
Czech Republic in recent years. We may see a relative fall in the number of execu-
tives working at the same place (especially between 5 and 10 years) vis-à-vis those 
newly hired or promoted. 
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TABLE 7: TENURE AT A GIVEN POSITION 
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Table 9 shows that the median pay for chosen executives has been falling relatively 
to median wages in the economy in recent years. 
TABLE 9: MEDIAN COMPENSATION COMPARISON 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
2002 15 542 68 761 442% 88 400 569% 52 627 339% 57 684 371% 
2003 16 707 74 923 448% 86 084 515% 56 654 339% 66 512 398% 
2004 17 706 77 511 438% 90 332 510% 58 804 332% 65 030 367% 
2005 18 589 78 299 421% 93 516 503% 62 555 337% 68 025 366% 
(1) median wages in economy (business and non-business), (2) m.w. of CEOs in big companies, (3) ratio of (2)/(1), (4) 
m.w. of CEOs in big industrial companies, (5) ratio of (4)/(1), (6) m.w. of CFOs in big companies, (7) ratio of (6)/(1), (8) 
m.w. of sales directors in big companies, (9) ratio of (8)/(1) 
Source: CZSO, Trexima, author's calculation 
However, table 10 shows a different picture. Especially in the years 2002 and 2003 
the average comparison followed the opposite development to the median values. 
Analyzing the data in tables 9 and 10, however, we have to realize that the sample 
used for the comparison included both top and middle managers and that the ex-
ecutives at the same positions have different discretionary rights in different com-
panies. The other (non-public) data samples show that the actual level of compen-
sation for top managers is approximately twice as high (than presented in the ta-
bles for all-level executives).57 
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TABLE 10: AVERAGE COMPENSATION COMPARISON 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
2000 13 864 78 325 565% n.a. n.a. 57 635 416% 63 627 459% 
2001 15 033 84 788 564% 98 399 655% 61 900 412% 68 192 454% 
2002 16 017 102 663 641% 111 247 695% 75 672 472% 77 703 485% 
2003 16 951 111 372 657% 116 780 689% 80 694 476% 86 095 508% 
2004 18 124 117 278 647% 121 658 671% 85 393 471% 90 289 498% 
2005 19 045 117 805 619% 128 528 675% 88 336 464% 93 661 492% 
(1) average wages in economy (business), (2) a.w. of CEOs in big companies, (3) ratio of (2)/(1), (4) a.w. of CEOs in big 
industrial companies, (5) ratio of (4)/(1), (6) a.w. of CFOs in big companies, (7) ratio of (6)/(1), (8) a.w. of sales direc-
tors in big companies, (9) ratio of (8)/(1) 
Source: CZSO, Trexima, author's calculation 
With respect to a distinctive data distribution (the median value is significantly 
lower than the median value); we may conclude that top managers (including su-
perstars) meaningfully increased their income relatively to both the whole popula-
tion and the rest of executives. Nevertheless, we may believe that the managerial 
power was less involved than in the transition period since recent development was 
characterised by strong foreign hiring. 
In brief international comparison, these wage relations resemble the Austrian ones 
at most. A lower spread may be seen in Scandinavian countries and higher in South 
European countries (and in Germany as well).58 
5. GOVERNANCE AND LEGAL ASPECTS 
5.1.  MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 
Gillies (2006) asks a question in his case study whom a CEO is accountable to in day-
to-day company leading? Is it just a board of directors? Even if s/he expects deci-
sions that in his/her best opinion would have detrimental effects upon a long-term 
firm value inevitably? Do duties of care and loyalty entitle a CEO to ask directly cho-
sen shareholders? And if so, where are the limits of his/her discretion placed? 
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We would like to show that answers are in the ambiguous definition of property 
rights which arises from historical division of ultimate owners and their rights and 
liabilities. 
Roots of the shareholding concept lie in capital inadequacy of individual owners in 
the period of overseas explorations. Richter (2005) talks about 19th century and the 
industrial revolution that unconditionally asked for capital pooling. Joint stock com-
panies naturally bound characteristics required for such capital cooperation – lim-
ited liability, liquidity, and specialization. We may say that joint stock companies 
defined themselves by their operational assumptions. The trouble emerges with the 
application of natural understanding of an owner as the ultimate decision-maker. 
And s/he really is so in a simple example of a sole trader. This natural understand-
ing is correctly expressed in the unlimited liability of the owner. But, joint stock 
companies and the limited liability bring a qualitatively different entity. The phe-
nomenon of the liability-ownership-control division blurs the subject of the ulti-
mate owner whom a CEO is accountable to in a natural law sense. Management 
accountability then means looking for this ultimate owner. 
Historically, joint stock companies seem to be the most viable competitive struc-
ture. Their legal form, as Richter (2005) emphasizes, has undergone long evolution 
of an institutional selection. Today most of advanced-economies production comes 
from those companies. This should indicate that limited liability is conditional to a 
capital concentration; hence, the limited liability is the most competitive economic 
structure. This does not mean that there are no other costs; it just means that the 
transaction costs are optimized. Richter (2005) continues in the same manner when 
embedding liquidity and management specialization into the trinity of a joint stock 
company definition, where the former allows investors to diversify their portfolios 
and the latter is the basis for large centralized corporations with professional ad-
ministration. We would add that this approach indicates evolutional superiority of 
professional management over other management structures; gains more then 
balance possible higher costs concerning ownership-control division and other inef-
ficiencies. 
Shareholders have rights to dividends, a liquidation balance, and to take part in 
general assemblies. Thus, shareholders are not the ultimate owners in the tradi-
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tional Roman sense. Since limited liability companies became more abstract enti-
ties, shareholders are rather some of capital providers (similarly as creditors, just 
with the above distinctive rights). Therefore, we divert from natural property rights 
to legally-based positive rights. 
The shareholder model is based on two distinct characteristics. Firstly, a firm is seen 
as a nexus of complete contracts with creditors, employees, suppliers, and the like 
(Becht at al., 2005), where just shareholder contracts are incomplete. Hence, Rich-
ter (2005) concludes that shareholders’ voting rights are a natural response. Sec-
ondly, the model arose from the residual claimant definition. Voting rights could be 
delegated on creditors, employees, the management, shareholders or any of their 
combinations; nonetheless, the corporate law gives the privilege to shareholders 
who are the residual claimants. That is not the question of accountability; it is the 
question of economic rationality. In this view, Becht at al. (2005) see the maximiza-
tion of the shareholder value as a reflection of economic efficiency after all contrac-
tual obligations have been settled. It is in the shareholders’ best interest – more 
than in the interest of the other stakeholders – to control thoroughly the company. 
Of course, you could ask with Williamson (1984)59 why we do not see only fully in-
debted corporations when debtors could get better legal (contractual) protection. 
While creditors get better legal protection, high leverage bears substantial costs of 
financial distress. Firm revenues seem to be optimized for different proportions of 
equity and debt based on a trade-off between costs of residual claimants and costs 
of financial distress. 
It is the legal structure which may and do legitimate other than shareholders’ con-
trolling rights. Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) found that following poor perform-
ance financial institutions (especially banks) take control over running the corpora-
tions. Possible actions may include appointments of new board members (changes 
in managements would be the natural consequence). The example shows the role 
which the corporate law delegates on distinct stakeholders. Dodd (1932)60 in then 
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famous disputation with Berle asked for even further legally defined rights for other 
constituencies – employees or customers. The case of Germany, for instance, indi-
cates that his approach is not unique either today. 
If we encompass the idea of mutual supplementing of shareholder/stakeholder 
models based on a given legal framework, elegantly stated “[the] stakeholder firm 
would achieve almost as a by-product, what a profit-maximizing firm would achieve 
as an objective” (Moore, 1999).61 
To sum up, theory understands that relationships in modern corporations are am-
biguous and uncertain in definitions. We are convinced that the controversy is 
rooted in the very division of the owner and his/her liability. Limited liability com-
panies created a situation in which the need of the ultimate owner became critical. 
The shareholder theory found shareholders as residual claimants and substituted 
them for those ultimate owners. In our view, however, residual claims are not as 
general as the unlimited liability. Therefore, the shareholder and stakeholder theo-
ries are not mutually exclusive anymore; and they rather supplement each other in 
given legal frameworks. In a word, there are no ultimate owners and executives are 
accountable to those who were prescribed in law for each particular situation in the 
life of the company. 
5.2.  LEGAL L IABILITY 
The delegation of controlling power requires a clear definition of fiduciary duties. 
Richter (2005) reminds that the duties of care and loyalty should be binding for 
both executives and members of boards since they operate in the similar environ-
ment. Real applicability is, however, disputable. Radical proponents claim that the 
fiduciary duty of care62 should be abolished since courts are not able to judge 
managerial skills. The duty of loyalty63 seems to be a bit more efficient in striking 
executive misbehaviour. However, in countries with weaker shareholder protec-
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 The liability of corporate executives to keep an appropriate degree of managerial skills. 
63 Standards prohibiting executives’ self-dealing and other transactions which would damage the company. 
  
 
5.2. Legal Liability 53 
tion, collective action problems indicate once again enforcement difficulties 
(Rehnert, 1985). The author concludes that legal rules may be at least partly suc-
cessful in looking for solutions to evident self-dealing or fraud, much less then in 
managerial inefficiency. 
We would like to return to the question if mandatory or non-mandatory rules 
should be preferred in compensation relationships. We can agree with Richter 
(2005), who claims that it seems reasonable to have non-mandatory rules since a 
firm is generally understood, following our above discussion, as a nexus of con-
tracts. On the other hand, and that is a notable point, we have to review the institu-
tional environment correctly (local understanding of business ethics and customs, 
the corporate law and law enforceability, and the like). While we may agree that in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries it is justifiable to rely on non-mandatory rules, we be-
lieve that a reasonable level of mandatory rules in remuneration contracts may 
have its justification in the Czech Republic. Richter (2005) offers a few examples 
supporting the idea.64 The process of collective action, for instance, could be per-
ceived as a public good. Similarly, information asymmetries and moral hazard (in 
consequent contract breaking) are systematically inbuilt in the remuneration rela-
tions. Potentially better business environment could be understood as a positive 
externality. Moreover, rent-seeking managerial behaviour seems to be systemic to 
some extent; it cannot be diversified even with perfect capital and labour markets, 
accordingly. And lastly, mandatory rules are often understood as a public declara-
tion about desirable moral values. 
By law, just members of boards have been legally liable for losses caused to the 
company. This approach was logically opposed (Richter, 2005). Nowadays, corpo-
rate law prescribes the liability to other individuals who may significantly influence 
company operations as well.65 Thus, executives do not have to be members of 
boards at the same moment any more in order to be subject to legal liability. 
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 Compared to the common law system, we do not expect that these legal practices may occur in the civil law 
environment. 
65
 Obchodní zákoník (2006), § 66, (6). Executives as well as a large shareholder, for instance, may be made 
responsible and suited for losses caused to the company. 
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In reality, however, the aligning role of executives’ liability for losses is limited. The 
corporate law forbids any contractual agreements which could avoid such liability; 
nevertheless, the process itself appears to be a typical example of possible private 
market solution. And really, the liability helped to create a specialized insurance 
market with statutory liabilities. This insurance has become common in the Czech 
Republic similarly as it is in advanced countries. Thus, abstracting from criminal 
actions (fraud) executives are not at risk with respect to liabilities for losses.66 
Richter (2005) criticized also ambiguity in executives’ duties prescription in corpo-
rate law. Although some changes occurred in law,67 the explanation of due care68 is 
still ambiguous in precise description of behaviour and duties. Nevertheless, Petrov 
(2007) tends to a broader explanation which naturally includes both the duties of 
care and loyalty. However, other comments such as the reference to the mandate 
contract in liability prescriptions and the non-mandatory basis of rules remain 
valid.69 
To sum up, some of executives’ liabilities were better reflected in the revised cor-
porate law. Due care may finally be explained as including both the duties of care 
and loyalty. The liability for losses, moreover, is unambiguous nowadays. Its align-
ing role is, however, limited since almost all managers in larger companies are in-
sured. Similarly, need for non-mandatory rules in the agency issues were taken into 
account although further prescriptions should be amended in this respect. 
5.3.  BOARDS 
Board members should monitor a company management, they should hire and fire 
executives and, lastly, they should be responsible for firms’ compensation policies. 
Becht at al. (2005) likened the theoretical expectations to shareholder democracy 
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 Obchodní zákoník (2006), § 194, (5) 
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 “ ... vykonávat svou působnost s péčí řádného hospodáře ...“, dtto. 
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where a CEO represents the executive branch, a board of directors is the legislative 
branch and shareholders are the general electorate. 
The other level of control delegation between general meetings and executives 
bears additional transaction costs. Such costs must be balanced by economic bene-
fits. Richter (2005) mentions limits, for instance, which are imposed on large share-
holders’ discretional behaviour. Simply, having boards responsible for business ac-
tivities of the firm, they should be independent of (large) shareholders in day-to-
day activities.70 Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) point out that the institution of the 
boards is not the first-best solution. Boards are the second-best efficient solution to 
the whole set of transaction costs, including costs of roles specialization and collec-
tive action costs.71 
Before introducing some empirical findings, it is important to mention that meas-
urement of the value added by members of boards is quite ambiguous. Comparison 
within peer groups (with respect to the size of a company or industry it operates in) 
is generally accepted. NYSE requires and NASDAQ recommends, for instance, as-
sessment of boards, their committees and individual members for all listed compa-
nies (Klírová and Kavalíř, 2007). 
The two-tier board system with an executive board of directors and a controlling 
supervisory board can be seen compulsory in Germany, Austria, Portugal, or the 
Czech Republic, and voluntarily in France or Finland. On the top of it, Germany de-
mands a compulsory 50 percent employee representation in supervisory boards. 
Richter (2005) names just Austria and Portugal as the only European countries 
where the system of two boards is compulsory without any conditions. The exam-
ples of Germany and the Czech Republic are rather politically determined due to 
the employee representation. Furthermore, the two-tier system brings other trans-
action costs; hence, it is less efficient. This fact may be confirmed on the example of 
France where shareholders are obliged to choose between one-tier and two-tier 
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 See Obchodní zákoník (2006), § 194 (5) for the Czech reference. 
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 Situations in which the costs of a legal action are exercised by a few players while the revenues from that 
action are shared by all the others. A special case of the free-rider problem. 
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systems. This has been valid since 1966 and, still, just about 1 percent of companies 
have chosen the two-tier system (Richter, 2005). 
As far as the empirical findings are concerned, there is the sole consistent conclu-
sion on the board structure and company performance – the board size is in nega-
tive relations to profitability.72 Is it then reasonable to keep the boards as small as 
possible? It does not seem so. Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) ask why there are not 
just the smallest boards as allowed by law. The answer may be that there is no sin-
gle optimal board composition for all firms. If the board structure (including size) is 
endogenous (i.e. there are other factors of the correlation between the board size 
and performance as well), we should not encourage artificial decreasing of board 
members as suggested by the out-of-equilibrium approach. Since there is not the 
sole common equilibrium, these efforts would lead to rather adverse results. 
Focusing on the Czech Republic, we will describe the structure of boards and their 
responsibilities first. By law, a board of directors has at least three members unless 
there is the sole shareholder in the company. A supervisory board has at least three 
members as well and the co-determination asks from a one-third up to one half 
employee representation for companies with more than 50 regular employees.73 
General meetings appoint boards of directors and supervisory boards. The law of-
fers also a different model when just the supervisory board is appointed by the 
general meeting and the supervisors appoint the board of directors consequently. 
Besides, executive roles are played by a different body which consist of top manag-
ers. Both boards consist mainly of managers and shareholder and debtor (especially 
bank) representatives. The corporate law forbids being a member of both boards.74 
A typical board has three members; hence just the minimal law requirements are 
met.75 Nevertheless, for large companies the practice is different. Fahadová (2004) 
showed that the average number of supervisory board members is higher. In her 
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73
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75 [24] KPMG Česká republika, 9. 11. 2005 
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sample the average was 8,5 members in 2004. However, she also confirmed that 
the co-determination is understood rather as involuntary since in all the cases just 
the minimal law requirements were fulfilled.76 Richter (2005) reached a similar con-
clusion. The institution of co-determination is seen as a political instrument which 
helps to get a union support. Moreover, the author compares different approaches 
(to banks and to joint stock companies in general) and claims that the ineffective-
ness is well-known by legislators. 
We have concluded above that the number of members in boards seems to be en-
dogenous. Although empirical findings showed that smaller boards are aligned with 
higher efficiency, the endogenous approach indicates that we cannot prefer having 
the boards as small as possible. Moreover, the legal bottom limit of three members 
disables full optimization for companies which would find a lower number in any of 
boards more efficient. We offer three other variables for the endogeneity problem 
in the Czech Republic. Firstly, the transition emphasized the vulnerability of minor-
ity shareholders. Thus, having a representative in the boards could help to keep 
influence. Simply, a larger board is a naturally optimized result for companies with 
several smaller owners and worse institutional conditions. Secondly, more mem-
bers may express the majority shareholder’s usurpation of private benefits of con-
trol. Holding places in rather inactive boards may be a sophisticated (since legally 
correct) way of assets pocketing. And thirdly, a higher board may indicate the 
managerial power signs. Mutual executive representation in boards may increase 
their discretionary power. 
Boards of directors in the Czech Republic meet once a month usually; just one half 
of the boards of supervisors meets more than four times a year. Prevalently, the 
frequency is just once or twice a year. Generally, members of both boards claim 
that they are satisfied with the information they get from executives.77 
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Based on these conclusions, we have to refuse the recommendation from Kodex 
(2004). The Czech code of best practice does not hide the preference of the Anglo-
Saxon corporate governance structures to the continental ones in general. Although 
logical in the US or the UK, the pressure on the separation of the CEO and the 
chairman of the board of directors in the Czech Republic is not supported by con-
clusive arguments (including duality of other top managers). More to the others, 
the above discussion indicates that such combination could make the system more 
efficient.78 It is then quite interesting that in banks on the contrary the duality is 
compulsory by law.79 This would assume, nevertheless, that the board lost the 
power to decide on (their own) compensation. 
From the above we may see direct consequences for executive remuneration. 
Graph 7 shows who influence the level and the structure of CEO’s compensation. 
With respect to the above numbers on duality, we may see the power which CEOs 
can use in their own remuneration determinations. In concern with other managers 
the CEOs themselves decide on their own pay often. Moreover, there is no balance 
for this since the influence of supervisory boards is much lower (and the remunera-
tion committees are almost inexistent).80 
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 In combination with other modifications, of course. We have to realize that the transformation of the whole 
structure into the one-tier system (see for instance Richter (2005)) is much less feasible than reasonable 
changes in the given system. 
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 The bank code, cited in Kodex (2004). For detail analysis of the issue see Richter (2005). 
80 Unfortunately, the influence of parent companies is difficult to be discussed without more details. 
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GRAPH 
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62 Theories on Executive Compensation and Czech Practice 
ers as well as supervise the executives. Then, we would have to reconcile the struc-
ture of supervisory board members compensation. In brief, the board is supposed 
to disclose all information including adverse. Thus, contingent pay should not be 
used in supervisors’ compensation schemes (they should not get extra pay when 
the company goes well but also lose money when it goes bad). An improper appli-
cation of contingent pay in supervisors’ compensation revealed for instance the 
case of ČEZ which led to reassessment of remuneration schemes.83 But, conse-
quently, the scheme would result in insufficient incentive power. The free-rider 
problem would likely occur more often. This is the weakest point of the proposed 
system. We are able to offer just a few inconclusive requirements – development of 
the labour market with supervisors and shareholders activism would have to be 
supported, for instance. 
Interestingly, a step-by-step analysis has led us into the position which strongly 
resembles the Germen corporate governance approach. However, it appears rea-
sonably since we have assumed that the overall system would not be transformed 
into the one-tier governance structure. This leads us into the conclusion that based 
on given institutional (and mainly legal) conditions the German-like model is a cer-
tain efficient point of the institutional evolutionary process. Richter (2005) supports 
this idea since he claims that a comparison of the German bank-driven governance 
and the US capital-market-driven governance is ambiguous – no system presents 
long-term supremacy in corporate governance efficiency. 
5.4.  MARKET WITH CORPORATE CONTROL 
There are two main ways how to reduce agency costs. In addition to the internal 
instruments (contractual settings), these are supposed to be competitive markets. 
The exogenous forces consist primarily of product, capital and labour markets. Rich-
ter (2005) summarizes theoretical comments and claims that product markets are 
the ultimate institutions which unveil executives’ actions and quality of their deci-
sion-making. Companies which operate for a longer time under inefficient man-
agement would not alive in the long-run. This could lead to changes in owner-
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ship/shareholdings, or at least to changes at an executive level. However, this may 
take much time. 
If a company is publicly traded, capital markets are supposed to be much faster in 
information transfers than product markets. Any inefficiency is reflected in stock 
prices sooner than competitive problems occur. Moreover, capital markets create 
the market for corporate control which may be another streamlining instrument. 
Denis and McConnell (2003) confirm that the market for corporate control is espe-
cially active in Anglo-Saxon countries. Nevertheless, they found that even though 
the market as in the US and the UK absents in other countries, a different market 
with control exists. In Germany, following poor performance, outsiders make ef-
forts to gain some control in existing ownership blocks. Changes in boards and 
management follow similarly as in the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
The situation in the Czech Republic indicates that the whole environment resem-
bles the German experience. Graph 9 presents the number of mergers and acquisi-
tions in the Czech Republic between years 2002 and 2006. 
GRAPH 9: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
 
Source: Fúze a akvizice ve střední a východní Evropě 2004 – 2006, www.pwc.cz 
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investors. Moreover, it is important to notice that about 77 percent of transactions 
with disclosed price resulted in obtaining the ownership majority.84 
Nevertheless, since M&A have been on the increase generally in the world (and 
poor performance of companies is just one of the reasons for ownership changes), 
the presented data cannot be analyzed in a quantitative way. Rather, it is a trend 
confirmation and a confirmation of the German-like approach to the market with 
corporate control. 
5.5.  TAX TREATMENT 
Before concluding on the sole Czech environment, we will return to the US practice 
which helps us to reveal some general patterns. 
It is a fascinating question for economists whether people and companies look for 
the overall efficiency optimization or if they focus more or less intentionally just on 
partial optimization. Surprisingly, it seems that in the real world companies concen-
trate on the second-best solutions to the economic efficiency problems. Naturally, 
it is the tax optimization which plays the leading role. 
The significance of institutional settings is emphasized in La Porta at al. (1998b).85 
The legal system (including accounting and tax rules) is a crucial determinant of 
corporate governance mechanisms. The legal protection and law enforcement indi-
cate how corporate governance and corporate finance evolve in the particular 
country. The authors do no claim that the institutional factors have to be the driv-
ing force at all operational levels; nevertheless, Abowd (1990) proves they often 
are. In reality, composing the compensation package means often minimization of 
the total tax burden of principals and agents. Accordingly, contingent pay is not 
primarily the motivational instrument. Simply, many parts of the compensation 
package may be implemented for the sole reason of tax burden optimization. 
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Option contracting in the US is a perfect example for such reasoning. The recent 
changes in accounting and reporting requirements for stock options (which resulted 
in a gradual diversion from the overwhelming use of options in executive compen-
sation contracts as we have written above) confirm these findings. 
Accounting rules in the US had been set in a way where the accounting charge 
equalled the spread between the grant-day stock price and the exercise price if the 
exercise price and terms were fixed in advance. Since there were two separate 
ledgers (revenues and expenses), there was no accounting charge for premium and 
at-the-money options with fixed terms. There is no surprise we could see these 
options prevalently.86 Moreover, for non-qualified options there was even a more 
favourable tax treatment since the spread between the stock price and the exercise 
price (at the time when the options were vested) constituted expense for taxable 
reasons. This tax reduction more than offset the personal income tax for executives 
(Murphy, 1999; Hall and Murphy, 2003; Hall and Murphy, 2000).87 As we have al-
ready mentioned, cancellation of this favourable treatment was one of the most 
important factors for relative fall of stock options usage in executive compensation. 
Similarly, in 1994 tax law amendments were imposed. The executive compensation 
in excess of USD 1 mil. was labelled as the non-performance related. From a com-
pany’s income tax point of view higher values became non deductible. Although the 
reason was to decrease high rewards which had drawn more and more public at-
tention, the opposite happened. Companies increased both the non-contingent and 
contingent pay. The level of non-contingent compensation approached USD 1 mil. 
since this value seemed suddenly as governance-blessed. Moreover, labelled as 
performance related the contingent pay was also fuelled since excluded from the 
limits (Jensen and Murphy, 2004). 
The most striking fact is as it seems from the above that principals value tax reduc-
tions higher than possible growth effects from pay-performance incentives. Inten-
tionally or not, they do not believe in compensation incentives as much as the dis-
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cussions about executive motivation indicate. This could really mean that executive 
compensation policies focus rather on tax and other optimization than on the in-
centive power, motivation and relationships building. 
Moreover, this finding seems to be supported by comparison to the UK. Conyon 
and Murphy (2000) performed a thorough comparative study on the US and UK 
accounting and tax regulations and on public and governmental inferences in com-
pensation processes. The study showed that until 1995 the popularity of stock op-
tions in the UK had been even higher than in the US. Nevertheless, in 1995 the 
situation changed completely and stock option grants became publicly highly con-
troversial. Examples of excessive executive pay in then privatized electric utilities 
emerged and, afterwards, the stock options were treated as an inadequate way of 
the executive remuneration. Further, the UK capital markets growth was half as fast 
as in the US and executives’ pressure on stock option grants were lower. Greenbury 
Report (1995)88 then recommended substitution of stock options for LTIPs as a po-
tential solution. Although not compulsory, the recommendations were generally 
accepted and supported by additional legal changes. As a result of changed public 
and tax and accounting environment, the ratio between stock options and LTIPs 
reversed. 
In the Czech Republic the stock-based instruments are much less in use as we have 
presented. Therefore, we cannot follow the same reasoning as in the above text. 
Instead, since remuneration benefits become more and more common, we will 
concentrate on them. Thus, analyzing compensation benefits we would like to con-
firm that in the Czech Republic, too, tax optimization in executive compensation is 
more important than its incentive elements. 
Firstly, we will go through pension contributions. On the employer side, contribu-
tions to state-subsidised retirement plans up to 5 percent of the basis for social 
contribution payments are tax exempted. For employees, the yearly limit of TCZK 
12 is tax deductible. Although the limits are very low reflecting executives’ total 
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compensation, these values are applied mostly. Secondly, we will show the optimi-
zation on the example of life insurance contributions. Yearly, life insurance in the 
Czech Republic is not taxable up to TCZK 12 and 8 for employees and the employer, 
respectively. And once again, these values are used in most executive compensa-
tion plans, although very low in the relative comparison. Lastly, company loans up 
to TCZK 100 are exempted from the income tax. In previous text we have shown 
that it is the value which companies mostly lent to executives.89 
To conclude, similarly as in the US and the UK (and we believe that generalization is 
possible in this case), Czech practice concentrates more on legal settings than on 
incentive power of particular instruments when structuring the executive pay. This 
is surprising if we realize the marginal product which is attributed to any changes in 
executives’ effort. Therefore, from this point of view we may agree with opinions 
suggesting that removal of accounting and taxation rules which distort the decision-
making of board members and consultants could be beneficial (Ferrariny at al., 
2003). In this manner, the essential incentive function of compensation would get a 
new impulse. 
5.6.  CODE OF BEST PRACTICE AND D ISCLOSURE 
A code of best practice is still a relatively new subject in corporate governance al-
though it has been going through a rash development. In Europe, the first code of 
best practice was issued in 1992 in the UK. The following codes have been reflecting 
many of its points. Denis and McConnell (2003) draw attention to apparent cases of 
partial corporate governance system convergences. The US, Germany and Japan are 
often mentioned as representatives of distinctive corporate governance ap-
proaches. In authors’ view, Germany and Japan have been drifting to a single-tier-
like model with the insider and outsider representation and a relatively small num-
ber of members. The level of ownership concentration falls, financial institutions 
play less significant roles and cross-holdings do not deepen. To the contrary, large 
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shareholders have become more common in the US. They also note that the codes 
of best practice – being on increase in the world – derive rather from Anglo-Saxon 
corporate governance models. The authors emphasized that it was much more 
complicated for continental countries to comply with the codes since the control-
ling large shareholders understand the codes as instruments which limit their deci-
sion power. 
The Czech code of best practice (referred as (Kodex, 2004)) is a revised version of 
the first code which emerged in 2001 as a joint document of the Czech Securities 
Commission,90 expert groups and British counterparts. The revision reflected new 
OECD principles and mitigated the influence of the Anglo-Saxon-based recommen-
dations which were evidently inappropriate for the Czech corporate governance 
structures (Mejstřík, 2005). Moreover, Kodex (2004) included conclusions and rea-
soning of the European Commission’s suggestions published in its proposal focused 
on enhancing corporate governance systems in the EU countries.91 Those responsi-
ble for the code emphasized its voluntary basis. Nevertheless, there were firms 
which included the reference on the compliance with the code into their annual 
reports.92 
For us, just parts concerning executive compensation are important. Among other 
recommendations, Kodex (2004) pursued to implement a compulsory individual 
disclosure of executive remuneration (including the description of a given compen-
sation system). Members of parliament, however, changed the rule into the group 
disclosure for both boards. Moreover, just publicly traded companies were in-
cluded. In spite of the lower requirements, in 2006 about one fourth of the compa-
nies did not comply.93 Basically, this approach is not consistent with the develop-
ment in advanced economies. The use of disclosure is presented as a corporate 
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governance reforming tool and it is accepted in both the major European govern-
ance systems (in the UK as well as in continental Europe; Ferrariny, 2003). Similarly, 
the US decided to change 14 years old rules of disclosure in 2006 and, newly, pub-
licly traded companies in the US have to specify in large detail individual compensa-
tion structures of five highest executives as we have written above.94 
We may also compare approaches of some CEE countries to disclosure in general. 
Although disclosing of information on executive compensation is rare, the situation 
differentiates across countries regarding the rest of information. Berglöf and Pa-
juste (2005) present that electronic disclosure is best in the Czech Republic, Slova-
kia and Slovenia. The worst results were recorded in Bulgaria, Romania and Lithua-
nia. With respect to disclosure in annual reports, the Czech Republic is again quite 
successful since it is placed second behind Estonia. Least information is disclosed in 
Romania and Latvia and still unsatisfactory are results in Bulgaria and also in Slova-
kia. 
Nevertheless, we hypothesize that the full disclosure of executive compensation 
could lead to stronger tendencies to apply stealth compensation instruments. 
Abroad, the risk of a rocketing increase in the average pay and a detrimental effect 
on workers’ motivation is ascribed to the full disclosure.95 In spite of that the full 
disclosure has been applied in the UK, France, Italy, the Netherland, Sweden, or 
Spain among the EU countries. Newly, the same is true for Germany where the 
previous voluntary approach did not work well.96 However, with respect to the 
above text, we cannot recommend the full disclosure in the Czech Republic at the 
moment. The reasoning differs from comments of corporate leaders which relate to 
the non-readiness of the Czech society. In our view, it is the corporate governance 
in the Czech Republic which does not allow getting closer to advanced economies in 
this respect. Neglecting the institutional background would push the corporate 
sector into the risk of a vicious circle of stealth compensation and earnings man-
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agement since the actual structure of boards, procedures and labour markets is not 
able to absorb the potential full disclosure. We result from the above analysis of the 
board structure and board members’ responsibilities in the Czech Republic. This 
analysis indicated that the supervision is too weak to balance the power of execu-
tives and executive members of boards of directors at the moment. Application of 
the disclosure would probably lead to fossilisation of the immature governance 
system and would deepen its shortcomings since camouflaging could institutional-
ize. 
In general we remain to be advocates of the full disclosure. The impact of the in-
formation value on markets and its consequences for corporate governance justify 
even the mandatory basis of potential new corporate governance rules. Moreover, 
we believe that the information asymmetries do not allow for optimal development 
of institutions at present. However, before the structure of boards and authorities 
of its members are adjusted with respect to the above recommendation, we have 
to oppose the full disclosure with respect to the risk of institutionalization of ad-
verse effects. 
6. CONCLUSION 
We have made an effort to show that executive compensation is a complex institu-
tionally-based issue. Realizing that Czech data sources do not allow for a compre-
hensive quantitative research, we have focused on a comparative analysis of quali-
tative aspects of managerial remuneration. 
We have shown that limited liability of joint stock companies does not allow for 
unambiguous addressing of the ultimate owner. Thus, it is the corporate law and 
the general institutional environment which distribute discretions and rights for all 
possible business contingencies. 
We have seen that the principal-agent model is strong especially in its descriptive 
part. It clearly and illustratively analyzes involved parties and their roles and re-
sponsibilities. Based on the self-interested economic man it makes an effort to es-
tablish the rules for optimal contracting which is seen as the prime solution to 
agency costs minimization. For its theoretical applicability, the model uses strong 
assumptions which do not allow for versatile empirical applicability. On the other
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hand, we are convinced that especially in economics this approach will keep its 
strong position among other models. In principle, it is the sole approach which un-
ambiguously works with incentives in a direct causal sense. Summarizing the as-
sumptions, the model suffers from three main shortcomings. Firstly, it is its oppor-
tunistic reasoning; secondly, it is a missing assumption about biasness in the con-
tracting process, and; thirdly, it is its practical focus on easily measurable perform-
ance variables. 
The managerial power model reacts to one of the strong assumptions of the princi-
pal-agent model since it claims that the contracting process is not exogenous. In its 
reasoning, executives may apply their power on potential re-appointments of board 
members who, in return, positively influence executives’ pay. 
The stewardship models reacts to yet another assumption of the principal-agent 
model. The model assumes the self-actualizing man who does not tend to behave 
opportunistically. More to the other, this model claims that the economic under-
standing of man limits people from their distinct needs satisfaction. Based on that, 
the principal-agent behaviour is supposed to spoil potential synergies which natu-
rally emerge in co-operation. At the end, however, the stewardship model is quite 
inconclusive in its recommendations. 
Having analyzed the models, we have attempted to classify the Czech Republic ac-
cording to social preferences. We have concluded that the Czech society is indi-
vidualistic and reveals signs of high power distance. This would indicate that the 
principal-agent behaviour prevails in Czech business. Since contingent pay is as-
sumed to be a partial solution to such type of behaviour, we have to be especially 
cautious. The contingent pay is subject to multiple trade-off effects. In the first in-
stance, executives realize which dimensions of performance are preferred (and 
rewarded) and allocate their activities based on such given preferences. Thus, ana-
lyzing performance measures, we have indicated that instead of promoting effort, 
contingent pay may provoke value decreasing and even fraudulent activities. 
Understanding of the systemic bias in reporting and executive behaviour led us to 
the conclusion that the re-assessment of compensation rules in the Czech Republic 
is needed on the mandatory law basis. Nevertheless, we have revealed that some 
of persistent objections to corporate governance rules  are  better  reflected  in  the  
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revised corporate law. This includes for instance the explanation of due care and 
executives’ liability for economic losses. 
The stewardship models reacts to yet another assumption of the principal-agent 
model. The model assumes the self-actualizing man who does not tend to behave 
opportunistically. More to the other, this model claims that the economic under-
standing of man limits people from their distinct needs satisfaction. Based on that, 
the principal-agent behaviour is supposed to spoil potential synergies which natu-
rally emerge in co-operation. At the end, however, the stewardship model is quite 
inconclusive in its recommendations. 
Having analyzed the models, we have attempted to classify the Czech Republic ac-
cording to social preferences. We have concluded that the Czech society is indi-
vidualistic and reveals signs of high power distance. This would indicate that the 
principal-agent behaviour prevails in Czech business. Since contingent pay is as-
sumed to be a partial solution to such type of behaviour, we have to be especially 
cautious. The contingent pay is subject to multiple trade-off effects. In the first in-
stance, executives realize which dimensions of performance are preferred (and 
rewarded) and allocate their activities based on such given preferences. Thus, ana-
lyzing performance measures, we have indicated that instead of promoting effort, 
contingent pay may provoke value decreasing and even fraudulent activities. 
Understanding of the systemic bias in reporting and executive behaviour led us to 
the conclusion that the re-assessment of compensation rules in the Czech Republic 
is needed on the mandatory law basis. Nevertheless, we have revealed that some 
of persistent objections to corporate governance rules are better reflected in the 
revised corporate law. This includes for instance the explanation of due care and 
executives’ liability for economic losses. 
We have also shown that the company size is positively correlated with the com-
pensation of supervisory board members. However, this conclusion was not statis-
tically significant and other comparisons demonstrated that data sources on execu-
tive (and board member) compensation are insufficient for more complex quantita-
tive studies. 
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Describing the prevalent bonus schemes, we have concluded that the incentive 
zone is quite short and the payment scheme seems to be reduced largely to a biva-
lent zero-one model. This reward structure may suppress the long-term effort. 
Rather, it is supposed to intensify efforts to simply cross performance thresholds. In 
a word, average bonus plans in the Czech Republic may provoke goals displacement 
or even the earnings management. 
In the consequent debate about stock options we have indicated that their further 
expansion in the Czech Republic is questionable at the moment. We have resulted 
from the realization that the stock options are a perfect instrument for camouflag-
ing. Moreover, Czech practice illustrated that the use of stock options is rather un-
systematic without more profound understanding of their benefits and risks.  
The analysis of data on fluctuations showed that both external hiring and internal 
promotions effects have been quite strong in recent years. With respect to the 
theoretical background, we have summarized that this is one of the reasons why 
top managers meaningfully increased their income relatively to both the whole 
population and the rest of executives. 
Discussing the structure of boards, we have rejected the empirical conclusion about 
the board size and its negative relation to profitability. As far as the Czech practice 
is concerned, we are proponents of the endogenous explanation which indicates 
that there is not the sole common equilibrium and that decreasing of the number 
of board members may lead to adverse performance effects. 
A similar analysis led us to the conclusion that the pressure on separation of the 
CEO and the chairman of the board of directors (and on the presence of other ex-
ecutives in the board) in the Czech Republic is inappropriate. We are convinced that 
the structure of boards and a blurred definition of the executives’ accountability is 
the fundamental cause of higher agency costs. In given institutions, companies 
seem to look for structures with lower transaction costs, although their leaders 
probably realize that they balance the law requirements. One of the most striking 
facts is that the supervisory boards are inactive and often just cover executive deci-
sions. 
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This structure has also a straightforward impact on compensation. Since it is the 
board of directors and the CEO who normally decide on remuneration plans, it 
means in a word that top managers decide on their own pay often. In our revised 
corporate governance structure, this should be the exclusive discretion of the su-
pervisory board. In fact, step-by-step we got to the model which strongly resembles 
the German corporate governance system. 
Although being advocates of the full disclosure in general, we have also opposed 
that with respect to the risk of institutionalization of adverse effects. Before the full 
disclosure, the above adjustments to the structure of boards and better distribution 
of authorities are needed. 
Finally, we have heretically indicated that the whole thesis may have little justifica-
tion since the Czech (as well as international) practice concentrates rather on ac-
counting and tax optimization than on motivational aspects of particular compensa-
tion instruments. 
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